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No PLACE FOR MELROSE:
CHANNELSURFING, HUMAN RIGHTS,
AND THE EUROPEAN UNION'S
"TELEVISION WITHOUT FRONTIERS"

DIRECTIVE

Lucien J. Dhooge*

"[Television brings us] a light of the mind that comes into almost
every home in the world, during these last years of the twentieth
century. It is the light that new knowledge brings."'
2
"57 channels, nothin's on."
I. INTRODUCTION

"Boob tube," "idiot box," a "vast wasteland," messenger of the

global telecommunications village,3 or harbinger of the coming planetary

culture. 4 All of these terms have been used, at one time or another, to
characterize the omnipresent medium of modern television. There can be
no doubt that network television and its more recent cousin, cable

* Assistant Professor of Business Law, University of the Pacific; B.A., 1980,
University of Colorado; J.D., 1983, University of Denver; LL.M., International and
Comparative Law, 1995, Georgetown University Law Center; Member, Colorado and
District of Columbia Bars. The author wishes to thank his family and friends for their
constant encouragement and inspiration. This article is dedicated to Professor Markus
Puder of the Georgetown University Law Center and Professor Wolfgang G. Mincke of
the University of Maastricht.
1. CHARLES VAN DOREN, A HISTORY OF KNOWLEDGE: PAST, PRESENT, AND FUTURE

372 (1991).
2. BRUCE SPRINGSTEEN, 57 Channels (Nothin's On), on HUMAN TOUCH (Columbia
Records 1992).
3. 135 Cong. Rec. H7332 (daily ed. Oct. 23, 1989) (statement of Rep. Markey).
4. ARMAND MATTELART ET AL., INTERNATIONAL IMAGE MARKETS: IN SEARCH OF
AN ALTERNATIVE PERSPECTIVE 7 (David Buxton trans., 1984).
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television, are wondrous sciences. In the twenty-five odd years since its
birth, cable television and its high-tech children, satellite and pay-per-view
television, are alive and thriving. A multitude of viewing options are
often but a flick of the remote control away.
Love it or loathe it, defenders and critics of television both agree on
one thing: television's presence and ability to communicate events are
extremely powerful and virtually limitless. Recent surveys indicate that
there are over 800 million television sets worldwide.' The average
viewer's daily consumption of television is measured in vast blocks of
time, hours not minutes. In many homes, the television projects its
images continuously, providing a running commentary of the day's
"electronic events" as a backdrop to the mundane routine of daily
existence. 6 Surveys also reveal what every parent who has ever attempted
to pry his or her children away from the latest episode of Barney and
Friends or Melrose Place already knows, modern children spend more
time every year in front of the television than in their classrooms at
school.' The living room couch has become their desk and the television's
flickering light their surrogate teacher. The issue of whether the
mesmerizing influence television has over its viewers is truly an addiction
is best left to sociologists. What is obvious is that, worldwide and
irrespective of geographic or political boundaries, television is a pervasive
presence.
More controversial is the issue of television's influence over its
viewers and its ability to shape events. Undoubtedly, television is a
powerful medium that, if used masterfully, may result in great success,
and, if underestimated, may lead to abysmal failure. To see this principle
in action one need only recall the 1960 presidential debate between a
youthful-appearing John F. Kennedy and an apparently unshaven Richard
M. Nixon, the United States' military experiences in Vietnam and the Gulf
War, or the election of Ronald Reagan, "The Great Communicator," to
the nation's highest post. On a global scale, television has brought the
tragedy of the Ethiopian and Somalian famines and the triumph of
democracy over the shackles of communism in Eastern Europe, and its
converse in Tienanmen Square, into our homes. These examples, and
innumerable others, remind us of television's important role as a

5. TELEVISION DIGEST, INC., 62 TV & CABLE FACTBOOK B-304 (1994).
6. VAN DOREN, supra note 1.

7. Steven Greenhouse, Ideas and Trends: 77te Television EuropeansLove, and Love
to Hate, N.Y. TIMEs, Aug. 13, 1989, § 4, at 24.
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messenger of events and information and portrayer of the human
condition.
It may be stated that one of television's greatest achievements is
allowing millions of viewers to share common experiences and information
on a global and almost instantaneous basis.8 It is a clichd to state that as
a result of television's global reach the world is a smaller place, but it is
no less true. The advent of global channels, such as the Cable News
Network, allows citizens of the United States, Switzerland, and Japan to
view the same images, if they so choose, and to share their thoughts with
other members of the global telecommunications village. Information
which formerly took days or weeks to arrive at distant locations is beamed
daily, on a twenty-four hour basis, to remote corners of the globe.
Diverse viewers from all over the world and having disparate backgrounds
may share a single image or piece of information garnered from television
Furthermore, images and
as their sole element of commonality.
information shared through global television leads to greater transparency
in the arena of national affairs as well as international relations. Indeed,
television, along with the other accoutrements of the so-called
"information superhighway," has fostered an era of instantaneous global
communication and information-sharing. As a result, "a global culture
shuffles together the everyday lives of different continents, weaving
around the planet a network of electronic information that offers a
continuous world-wide show hooked up to life itself." 9

8. The author is here referring to shared experiences and information relating to
political, social, economic, scientific, and cultural events and phenomena. The author
would distinguish this from the spontaneous viewing of an episode of Gilligan's Island or
Star Trek, which may be experienced on a global basis through syndication. This
distinction is important as shared global access to quality television programming also
includes access to considerable "video trash." The author acknowledges that there are
those television critics who would conclude that most, if not all, television programming
consists of such "video trash."
While conceding the existence of poor quality
programming, the author would prefer not to take such a cynical outlook on the content
of all television programming.
9. MATTELART, supra note 4, at 7. However, some commentators are not convinced
of the desirability of this "continous world-wide show." For example, Clifford Orwin,
in his article Compassion and the Globalization of the Spectacle of Suffering, condemns
the globalization of television broadcasting, the so-called "CNN Factor," as serving to
desensitize viewers and turn them into "voyeurs of the global village." Clifford Orwin,
Compassion and the Globalizationof the Spectacle of Suffering, quoted in George F. Will,
An End to Compassion, WASH. POST, Nov. 19, 1995, at C9. Will agreed with Orwin's
characterization and deemed the globalization of television broadcasting as providing a
'window on the distress of fellow human beings." Id. United Nations Secretary-General
Boutros Boutros-Ghali has characterized the globalization of television news broadcasting
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The importance of the technological possibilities of television has not
been lost upon members of the international community. Politicians intent
upon opening the doors of closed societies or keeping them tightly shut to
the outside world have utilized the medium of television to suit their
purposes. The importance of this medium was not lost upon the framers
of the numerous international human rights instruments that arose in the
years subsequent to World War II. The Universal Declaration of Human
Rights ("Universal Declaration"), enacted by the United Nations General
Assembly in 1948, was the first international instrument to recognize the
right of all persons to "seek, receive and impart information and ideas
through any media and regardless of frontiers."10
Eighteen years later, the United Nations General Assembly reaffirmed
its commitment to the principle of free access to information and ideas
through the media by enacting the International Covenant on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights ("ESC Covenant")" and the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights ("CP Covenant").' 2 Article 15 of
the ESC Covenant urges contracting states to take all necessary steps to
achieve the development and diffusion of science and culture through
international contacts and cooperation. 3 More specifically, Article 19 of
the CP Covenant guarantees the right of all persons to "seek, receive and
impart information and ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers, either
orally, in writing or in print, in the form of art, or through any other
media of his [or her] choice." 4 Any doubts that existed in the late 1940s

as serving to "appoint CNN [as] the sixteenth member of the [United Nations'] Security
Council." Boutros Boutros-Ghali, quoted in David Reiff, The Humanitarian Trap,
WORLD POL'Y J., Winter 1995-96, at 7. ButseeJessicaMathews, 7he New Isolationism,
WASH. POST, Feb. 5, 1996, at A21 (stating that, except in times of crisis, the Cable News
Network's coverage of foreign affairs reaches fewer than one million Americans).
According to Stephen Hess of the Brookings Institution, the inadequate coverage of
foreign affairs by the Cable News Network, when combined with the lack of foreign
coverage by local media, has resulted in "one nation and two media societies, one awash
in information and the rest a desert, . . . one mindful of America's obligations and
leadership role and immersed iii the global economy, the other ignorant of the former and
fearful of the latter." Stephen Hess, quoted in Mathews, supra.
10. G.A. Res. 217A, U.N. Doc. A/810, at 71 (1948) [hereinafter Universal
Declaration].
11. G.A. Res. 2200 A(XXI), U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 49, U.N.
Doc. A/6316 (1966) [hereinafter ESC Covenant].
12. G.A. Res. 2200 A(XX1), U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 52, U.N.
Doc. A/6316 (1966) [hereinafter CP Covenant].
13. ESC Covenant, supra note 11, at art. 15.
14. CP Covenant, supra note 12, at art. 19(2).
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as to the applicability of the Universal Declaration to the relatively new
technology of television were most certainly resolved by the protections
set forth in the ESC and CP Covenants. Free access to programming and
the impartation of ideas through television thus achieved the status of
universally protected human rights.
Regional human rights organizations created after the end of World
War II also recognized free access to the media, including television, as
a human right subject to protection. 5 This right was recognized and
protected to the greatest degree by European states and, in particular, by
member countries of the European Community. 6 Access to the media and
the freedom to receive and impart information therein was first recognized
in the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and

Fundamental Freedoms,' 7 to which all present members of the European

Union are parties.'" Article 10 of the European Convention grants every
individual the right to freedom of expression, which includes the freedom
to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas without
interference by public authorities and regardless of frontiers."9 Television

15. See, e.g., American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, May 2, 1948,
art. IV, O.A.S. Off. Rec. OEA/ser.L/V/I.4, doc. 21, Rev. 6 (1979) (granting every
person the right to freedom of opinion, expression, and dissemination of ideas by any
medium whatsoever); American Convention on Human Rights, Nov. 22, 1969, art. 13(1),
O.A.S. Off. Rec. OEA/ser.K/XVI/I.1 Doc. 65, Rev. 1, Corr. 1, O.A.S.T.S., No. 36
(1970), reprinted in 9 I.L.M. 673 (1970) (granting every person the freedom to seek,
receive, and impart information and ideas, regardless of frontiers, through any medium
of his or her choice); and the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, June 27,
1901, art. 9, O.A.U. Doe. CABILEG/6713/Rev. 5 (1991), reprinted in 21 I.L.M. 59
(1982) (granting every individual the right to receive information and express and
disseminate opinions within the law).
16. The author uses the terms "European Community" and "European Union"
interchangeably depending on the time to which the author is referring. For all periods
of time prior to January 1, 1993, the effective date of the Treaty of European Union, the
author will use the term "European Community." See TREATY OF E-UROPEAN UNION.
The Treaty on European Union, often referred to as the Maastricht Treaty, amends the
Treaty Establishing the European Community. See infra note 129. For all subsequent
periods of time, the author will use the term "European Union."
17. European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 [hereinafter European Convention].
18. As of the time of the writing of this article, the European Union consists of
Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy,
Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom.
19. European Convention, supra note 17, art. 10(1) at 230.
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is expressly mentioned as one of the avenues of expression within the
parameters of the European Convention.2"
Numerous other international agreements concerning free access to the
mass media have been endorsed by members of the European Union. 21
For example, all member countries of the European Union are parties to
the Helsinki Accords, which arose from the Conference on Security and
Cooperation in Europe. 22 The Helsinki Accords, in part, recognize the
importance of the dissemination of information between participating states
and encourage a wider exchange and showing of audiovisual materials
Participating states pledged to facilitate the import of
between states.
audiovisual materials from other participating states.24 Participating states
also agreed to act in conformity with the principles embodied in the
Universal Declaration, the ESC Covenant, and the CP Covenant in the
field of human rights and fundamental freedoms. 25 Television is clearly
within the definition of "filmed and broadcast information" as utilized
throughout the Helsinki Accords. 26
Other examples of international agreements relating to free access to
the mass media to which members of the European Union have subscribed
include the Document of the Copenhagen Meeting of the Conference on
the Human Dimension of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in
Europe ("Copenhagen Document") 27 and the Charter of Paris for a New
Europe and a New Era of Democracy, Peace and Unity ("Charter of

20. Id.
21. With the exception of Greece, which is not a party to the CP Covenant, all
members of the European Union are also parties to the ESC and CP Covenants. See
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE, TREATIES IN FORCE: A LIST OF TREATIES AND
INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS OF THE UNITED STATES IN FORCE ON JANUARY 1, 1994

350 (1994).
22. Final Act Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, Aug. 1, 1975, 73
Dep't State Bull. 323 (1975), reprinted in 14 I.L.M. 1292 (1975) [hereinafter Helsinki
Accords].
23. Id. § 2(a)(iii) at 1316 (Co-operation in Humanitarian and Other Fields (Basket II),
Information).
24. Id.
25. Id. § l(a)(VII) at 1295 (Questions Relating to Security in Europe, Respect for
human rights and fundamental freedoms, including the freedom of thought, conscience,
religion or belief).
26. Id. § 2(a)(t) at 1316.
27. Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, Document of the Copenhagen
Meeting of the Conference on the Human Dimension, reprintedin 29 I.L.M. 1305 (1990)
[hereinafter Copenhagen Document].
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Paris").28 In the Copenhagen Document, participating states reaffirmed
their commitment to the principles set forth in the Universal Declaration,
the ESC Covenant, and the CP Covenant.29 These states also expressed
their commitment to respect the right of every individual to seek, receive,
and impart information and ideas without interference by public authorities
and regardless of frontiers.3 In the Charter of Paris, participating states
affirmed the principle that every individual has the right to freedom of
thought and expression. 3 Furthermore, participating states reaffirmed
their commitment to the principles expressed in the Helsinki Accords. 32
Despite the free access to the mass media guaranteed in these
instruments, efforts to regulate television were made in the 1970s amid
growing concern about the pervasiveness of the medium and its content.
Early efforts, such as the Reports of the Committee on the Mass Media
Material for a European Media Concept ("CAHMM Reports")," declined
to place limitations upon access to television programming. CAHMM
concluded that the state's proper role did not include content regulation,34
but, rather, the encouragement of a plurality of information sources to
serve the general public.3"
The conclusions reached by CAHMM were short-lived. Less than
six years after the publication of the CAHMM Reports, the Commission
of the European Communities issued its report on the audiovisual industry
for the Community, entitled Television Without Frontiers:Green Paperon
the Establishment of the Common Marketfor Broadcasting, Especially by
Satellite and Cable ("Green Paper"). 36 The Green Paper included many
recommendations for harmonizing Community broadcasting regulation.
28. Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, Charter of Paris for a New
Europe and a New Era of Democracy, Peace and Unity, reprinted in 30 I.L.M. 190
(1991) [hereinafter Charter of Paris].
29. Copenhagen Document, supra note 27, art. I, § 5.20 at 1309, art. I, § 24 at
1316.
30. Id. art. I, § 9.1 at 1311.
31. Charter of Paris, supra note 28, at 194, 204 (Human Rights, Democracy and Rule
of Law; Culture).
32. Id. at 204.
33. Committee on the Mass Media, Material for a European Media Concept: Reports
Submitted to the Committee of Ministers (1980) [hereinafter CAHMM Reports].
34. Id.§ 1 at 6.
35. Id. §3at6.
36. Commission of the European Communities, Television Without Frontiers: Green
Paper on the Establishment of the Common Market for Broadcasting, Especially by
Satellite and Cable, COM (84) 300 final (June 14, 1984) [hereinafter Green Paper].
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One of the methods of implementing the Green Paper proposed by the
Council of Ministers was the imposition of a quota upon television
programming originating within the Community.37 The proposed quota
was to commence at thirty percent of broadcasting time for programming
originating in the Community and be increased to sixty percent by
December, 1992.38 News, sporting events, game shows, advertising, and
teletext services were excluded from the proposed quota. 9
Two further developments occurred on the heels of the publication of
the Green Paper that hastened the Community's enactment of a
programming quota. In March 1989, numerous European states, including
members of the Community, ratified the European Convention on
Transfrontier Television ("Television Convention"). 4 Article 10(1) of the
Television Convention obligated signatory states to "ensure, where
practicable and by appropriate means, that broadcasters reserve for
European works a majority portion of their transmission time, excluding
the time appointed to news, sports events, games, advertising and teletext
services."4" This allocation of transmission time was to4 2be reached
progressieply through the application of appropriate criteria.
In September 1989, the application of programming quotas also
received support in a less formal and binding fashion in the Charter of
Delphes, a document cooperatively produced by the European artistic,
scientific, and academic communities.43 The Charter of Delphes declared
television to be the dominant form of mass media and the most influential
Furthermore, the Charter of Delphes'
element of modern culture.'
drafters declared the television program to be "an essential expression of
living culture"45 and a reflection of the social and cultural values and

37. Proposal for a Council Directive on the Coordination of Certain Provisions Laid
Down by Law, Regulation or Administrative Action in Member States Concerning the
Pursuit of Broadcasting Activities, 1986 O.J. (C 179) 4 [hereinafter Proposed Directive].
38. Id. art. 2 at 4.
39. Id.
40. European Convention on Transfrontier Television, May 5, 1989, Europ. T.S. No.
132 [hereinafter Television Convention].
41.

Id. art. 10(1) at 247.

42. Id.
43. Incantation de Delphes, Charte europdene pour ]a difense de la creation
audiovisuelte, Sept. 25-27, 1988, reprinted in part in DassmRs DE L' AJutOViSUEL, Ian..Feb. 1991, at 53 [hereinafter Charter of Delphes].
44. Id. pmbl. at 53.
45. Id. art. 1 at 53.
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46
The Charter of Delphes
characteristics of the broadcasting nation.
imposes on every European state the duty of protecting this expression of
European culture through all available means, including subsidies and
programming quotas. 41
By late 1989, the stage had been set for the enactment of a binding
programming quota within the Community. This quota came to life in the
form of a directive adopted by the Council of Ministers on October 3,
1989.48 The adoption of this directive, popularly coined the "Television
Without Frontiers" Directive ("Directive"),49 culminated a lengthy effort
to harmonize broadcasting and media regulation in the member states.
After much discussion and amendment, the Directive as adopted provides,
in part, that "member states shall ensure, where practicable and by
appropriate means, that broadcasters reserve for European Works, within
the meaning of Article 6, a majority proportion of their transmission time,
excluding the time appointed to news, sports events, games, advertising
and teletext services."5" This proportion of transmission time is to be
achieved progressively, having regard for "the broadcaster's informational,
educational, cultural and entertainment responsibilities." 51 The Directive
requires member states to enact implementing legislation at the national
level within five years of the adoption of the Directive.52 Member States
are also free to "require television broadcasters under their jurisdiction to
lay down more detailed or stricter rules in the area covered by [the
Directive]. "I In any event, the European content of a member state's
television broadcasting is not permitted to fall below its average for the
year 1988. 54 The purported purposes of the Directive are to prevent "the
creation of dominant positions which would lead to restrictions on
pluralism and freedom of televised information and of the information

46. Id. art. 2 at 53.
47. Id.
48. Council Directive 89/552 of 3 October 1989 on the Coordination of Certain
Provisions Laid Down by Law, Regulation or Administrative Action in Member States
Concerning the Pursuit of Television Broadcasting Activities, 1989 O.J, Eur. Comm. (L
298) 23 [hereinafter Directive].
49. The moniker "Television Without Frontiers" was first utilized in the Green Paper.
See Green Paper, supra note 36.
50. Directive, supra note 48, art. 6(1)-(4) at 27. For a definition of the term
"European works," see infra note 130 and accompanying text.
51. Directive, supra note 48, art. 6(1)-(4) at 27.
52. Id. art. 4(4) at 27.
53. Id. art. 3 at 26.
54. Id. art. 4(2) at 26.
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sector as a whole," 55 and to ensure "the independence of cultural
development in the Member States and the preservation of cultural
diversity in the Community."56

This article examines the Directive against this background and in
light of the prior commitments of the member states to permit free access
to the mass media regardless of national boundaries as provided for in
various binding and nonbinding international and regional human rights
instruments. This article first examines in detail the history of television
programming regulation in the European Union leading to the enactment
of the Directive, with specific emphasis on the issue of broadcasting
quotas. It then analyzes the quota set forth in the Directive in light of the
undertakings of member states pursuant to these various human rights
instruments. Finally, this article analyzes the alleged primary motive
underlying the enactment of the Directive, specifically, the protection and
preservation of European culture, and the compatibility of this purpose
with the language and operation of the Directive. This article concludes
that the real motivation of the Directive is to provide economic protection
to the European television and cinematographic industries against vastly
stronger foreign competitors and prevent these competitors' further
interpenetration of the European Union's audiovisual market.

II. THE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF THE
"TELEVISION WITHOUT FRONTIERS" DIRECTIVE
A. The Committee on the Mass Media
Initial Community efforts to regulate television programming
commenced in the 1970s amid growing concern about the pervasiveness
of the medium and its content. In 1976, the Committee of Ministers of
the Council of Europe established a committee of government-appointed
experts to examine numerous issues relating to the role of the audiovisual
industry in the member states. This committee, the CAHMM, spent four
years examining such controversial issues as "the role of the State with
regard to the media," 57 "international aspects of the free circulation of

55. Id.pmbl. at 24.

56. Id.
57. CAHMM Reports, supra note 33, at 1, 4-14. For a thorough summary of the
CAHMM Reports, see Laurence G. C. Kaplan, The European Community's "Television
Without Frontiers"Directive: Stimulating Europe to Regulate Culture, 8 EMORY INT'L L.
REV. 255, 271-77 (1994).
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information,""8 and the "cable distribution of radio and television
programmes. "'9

The conclusions set forth in the CAHMM Reports regarding these
issues are surprising given the subsequent history of audiovisual media
regulation in the European Union. Specifically, the CAHMM concluded
that "[tihe principle of freedom of information entails that the proper role
of the State is to take steps to ensure that the media be free to function in
accordance with the requirements of a democratic society." 6" The
CAHMM also concluded that the state's proper role did not include
making determinations of what is to be published or broadcast by the
media.6" According to the CAHMM, any media policy formulated at the
Community level should not only serve to improve the existing media
system but also to "maintain a plurality of information sources, and
allowing thereby a plurality of ideas and opinions. "62
The CAHMM Reports appear to be consistent with the freedom to
seek, receive, and impart information and ideas through any media and
regardless of frontiers as set forth in numerous international and European
human rights instruments. State content regulation is explicitly rejected.
The term "broadcasting quota" does not appear in the CAHMM Reports.
Rather, the CAHMM Reports reflect the appropriate role of the
government in the regulation of the audiovisual industry in a democratic
society. Broadcasters are free to air programming with little actual or
potential interference by government regulators with regard to content.
This freedom allows broadcasters to provide, and viewers to choose from
among, a wide range of information and sources and permits a wide
variety of ideas and opinions to circulate within society. Unfortunately,
the atmosphere in which the CAHMM rejected governmental content
regulation of the broadcast media was to have a short six-year life span.
B. The Green Paper
In 1986, the European Commission completed a two-year study of the
audiovisual industry within the Community and published the Green
Paper.63 The Green Paper has been aptly described as "a preparatory
58. CAHMM Reports, supra note 33, at 15-18.
59. Id. at 91-107.
60. Id. § 1 at 6.
61. Id.
62. Id.§3at6.
63. Green Paper, supra note 36, For a thorough summary of the Green Paper, see
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document intended to provide a basis for the harmonization of national
laws regulating television broadcasting among the

. . .

member states. "'

The Commission recommendations contained in the Green Paper were
made to achieve the primary objectives of fostering of the audiovisual
industry within the European Community and promoting greater
integration within and without the Community."5 In this regard, the
Commission made several recommendations regarding the proposed course
of audiovisual media regulation within the Community.
As will be discussed in a later section of this article, among the
methods proposed for the implementation of the Green Paper was a
proposal to impose a quota on television programming originating within
the Community.66 The proposed quota initially required member states to
reserve thirty percent of their broadcast time for programming originating
in the Community, excluding news, sporting events, game shows,
advertising, and teletext services. 67 The proposed quota was to increase
to sixty percent of programming by December, 1992.68 This proposal
represented the first instance of strict content regulation of television
through a Community-wide quota and would provide a cruciat basis far the
inclusion of a programming quota in the Directive three years later.
The quota set forth in the Proposed Directive was not without
controversy. West Germany and Denmark opposed the quota requirement
on the basis of a right to municipal control over cultural affairs.
Specifically, West Germany contended that the regulation and protection
of culture was a matter of local concern, and that the Community could
therefore not preempt the ability of federal and local governments to act
in this field. 69 Denmark advanced a similar argument and further
contended that the Community was not competent to legislate in the field

Kaplan, supra note 57, at 277-79.
64. Kelly L. Wilkins, Television Without Frontiers:An EEC BroadcastingPremiere,
14 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 195, 197 (1991).
65. Green Paper, supra note 36, at 28. The European Commission noted that the
"dissemination of information across national borders can do much to help the peoples of
Europe to recognize the common destiny they share . . . ." Id. Furthermore, the
Commission noted that the free flow of information across national borders would serve
as "a source of cultural enrichment" of the European peoples. Id. at 30.
66. Proposed Directive, sapra note 37, art. 2 at 4.

67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Kaplan, supra note 57, at 278.
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of cultural affairs.70 However, other member states wholeheartedly
embraced the concept of a Community-wide broadcasting quota.
The adoption of the Green Paper by the European Community and its
proposed implementation through a programming quota were truly
unfortunate events. On the edge of the information revolution, the
European Community took a step backward. The Green Paper implicitly
rejected free market principles of consumer choice in favor of
governmental control of the marketplace. Gone was any reference to the
state's proper role in encouraging a plurality of information sources to
serve the general public. Although it may be contended that the adoption
of the Green Paper in fact encouraged greater information exchanges
between members of the Community, this encouragement came at the cost
of a potential loss of access to non-Community broadcasting materials.
Rather than looking within and without the Community, to all sources of
intellectual and cultural enrichment in the burgeoning information age, the
member states chose to restrict viewers' access to sources of intellectual
and cultural enrichment originating outside of the Community, apparently
fearful of the impact of a plethora of informational sources upon the ability
of their citizens and cultures to compete in the world marketplace. This
narrow-mindedness and short-sightedness ultimately manifested itself in the
adoption of the Directive containing the controversial quota provision.
C. The European Convention on Transfrontier Television
In March 1989, representatives of the twenty-four members of the
Council of Europe, including the members of the European Community,
ratified the European Convention on Transfrontier Television. 7 Article
10 (1) of the Television Convention obligated signatory states to "ensure,
where practicable and by appropriate means, that broadcasters reserve for
European works a majority proportion of their transmission time,
excluding the time appointed to news, sports events, games, advertising
and teletext services. "72 This allocation of transmission time was to be
achieved progressively through the application of appropriate criteria,
having due regard to the "broadcaster's informational, educational,
cultural and entertainment responsibilities to its viewing public."73 The

70. Id.
71. Television Convention, supra note 40. For a complete summary of the Television
Convention, see Kaplan, supra note 57, at 279-80.
72. Television Convention, supra note 40, art. 10(1) at 247.
73. Id.
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language utilized in Article 10(1) is noteworthy as it is virtually identical
to the language of the quota provision74 in the Directive the European
Community enacted seven months later.
The programming quota contained within the Television Convention
is set forth in the Section entitled "Cultural Objectives."'
Like the
Proposed Directive implementing the Green Paper, the Television
Convention was apparently designed to protect and preserve European
culture from foreign contamination, albeit on a continental scale. The
Proposed Directive and the Television Convention share other common
attributes. For example, both instruments exclude news, sports events,
games, advertising, and teletext services from the quota.76 Furthermore,
both documents recognize the need for progressive implementation of the
quota requirement.77 However, the Proposed Directive establishes a six
year timetable for the complete implementation of the quota,78 while the
Television Convention simply refers to progressive achievement of the
quota requirement without specifying a timetable for complete
implementation.79
It is perhaps more important to note the substantive differences
between the Proposed Directive and the Television Convention. These
differences were to play a crucial role in the ultimate formulation of the
quota requirement as set forth in the Directive. The first substantive
difference is that the Proposed Directive recommended a initial
Community programming quota of thirty percent of transmission time that
was to be gradually increased to sixty percent.S
The Television
Convention set a static European programming quota consisting of the
majority of transmission time. 8 This difference was to prove to be a sore
point in the legislative debates leading to the enactment of the Directive.
A second substantive difference is the distinction made between
methods of quota implementation in the Proposed Directive and the
Television Convention. The Proposed Directive recommended a simple

74. Kaplan, supra note 57, at 280.
75. Television Convention, supra note 40, art. 10 at 247-48. See also Kaplan, supra
note 57, at 279.
76. Television Convention, supra note 40, art. 10 at 247-48.

77. Id.
78. Proposed Directive, supra note 37, art. 2 at 14.
79. Television Convention, supra note 40, art. 10 at 247-48.
80. Proposed Directive, supra note 37, art. 2 at 4.
81. Television Convention, supra note 40, art. 10 at 247-48.
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across-the-board quota on Community programming.1 2 The quota imposed
under the Television Convention was required to be implemented only
"where practicable" and "by appropriate means." 3 This distinction
proved to be crucial in the debates leading to the enactment of the
Directive. Despite these differences, no method for harmonizing these
potentially conflicting Community and European programming quotas was
set forth in the Convention itself."
The Television Convention may be viewed as a further refinement of
the Green Paper and the Proposed Directive and the direct precursor to the
The Television Convention attempts to ameliorate the
Directive.
potentially harsh consequences of the quota recommendations of the
Proposed Directive by providing for a reduced quota requirement and
implementation only if practicable and by appropriate means. The
language contained in the Television Convention clearly foreshadowed the
debate that was to occur between member states over the exact language
of the Directive. The Directive's imposition of a broadcasting quota
clearly owes its ultimate format to the Television Convention.
D. The Charter of Delphes
One other development in European broadcasting regulation predating
the Directive is relevant to the discussion of broadcasting quotas. In
September 1989, a diverse mix of European writers, artists, academicians,

82. Proposed Directive, supra note 37, art. 2 at 4.
83. Television Convention, supra note 40, art. 10(1) at 247.
84. For example, could a Community member state meet its Television Convention
quotaexclusively through Community programmingwhile actively excluding programming
from other non-Community European states? Such a result seems to be permissible
pursuant to the express language of Article 10 of the Television Convention. However,
this result is inconsistent with the spirit of the Convention, which is to foster the free flow
of information, including that carried by broadcast media, across not only Community
boundaries but European boundaries as well. An additional issue raised is what would the
consequences be for a Community member state that meets its Television Convention
quota through utilization of non-Community European programming but, as a result,
cannot meet its Community quota as established under the Proposed Directive. It may be
logically concluded that such a state may be more interested in satisfying its Community
quota, due to its closer relationship with its Community counterparts and the consequences
that may flow from noncompliance; however, such a conclusion is nothing more than a
logical assumption. The Television Convention is conveniently silent on these and other
more difficult issues. This potential for conflict was perhaps one of the motivations for
the attempted harmonization of the Green Paper, the Proposed Directive, and the
Television Convention in the definition of "European works" contained in the Directive.
See infra note 130 (defining "European works").
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scientists, and cinematographers produced the artistic equivalent of the
Television Convention in the Charter of Delphes.85 The Charter of
Delphes was the culmination of efforts by the European intellectual
community to address the future of the audiovisual industry in Europe and
potential problems arising therein. In this regard, the Charter of Delphes'
authors viewed themselves as actors "for the defense of and the future of
audiovisual creativity. 8 6 The authors of the Charter of Delphes intended
to stimulate Europe's collective political and moral conscience in an effort
to draw attention to what they believed to be a cultural crisis in the
audiovisual industry. 87 As such, the Charter of Delphes was aimed
directly at Community public opinion and institutions. 88
The Charter of Delphes consists of five basic principles recognized by
the authors and a demand for action. First and foremost among these
principles is that television is the dominant form of mass media and the
most influential element of modern culture. 89 In this regard, the television
program was deemed to be "an essential expression of living culture"" °
and a reflection of the social and cultural values and characteristics of the
broadcasting nation. 9' Given the dominant position of television and its
reflection of the modern cultural heritage of the broadcasting states, the
authors of the Charter of Delphes called upon the Community's legal
institutions to enact safeguards to prevent corruption and deterioration of
Community culture. These safeguards were to include financial support
for the audiovisual industry in the Community and the imposition of a
programming quota.92
Although the Charter of Delphes lacked legal force and effect,
proposed no specific quota upon Community broadcasting, and was drafted
subsequent to the adoption of the Green Paper and the Television
Convention, its effect cannot be underestimated. Basically, the Charter of
Delphes constituted an appeal from the Community's audiovisual industry
for assistance. Furthermore, in return for this assistance, the European
artistic community expressed its willingness to accept content regulation
85. Charter of Delphes, supra note 43. For a complete summary of the Charter, see
Kaplan, supra note 57, at 280-84.
86. Charter of Delphes, supra note 43, pmbl. at 53.
87. Kaplan, supra note 57, at 281.
88. Charter of Delphes, supra note 43, pmbl. at 53.
89. Id.
90. Id. art. 1 at 53.
91. Id. art. 2 at 53.
92. Id.
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of broadcasting through the imposition of a quota. The strong language
contained within the Charter of Delphes and its blunt challenge to the
Community's governing institutions to take appropriate and effective action
no doubt aided proponents of programming quotas in the passage of the
Directive.
It is also worth noting that the Charter of Delphes represented an
attempt to elevate television to a status above ordinary goods and services
subject to special and comprehensive regulation by the Community.93 This
intent is clearly evident from the language of the Charter of Delphes,
which concludes that the television program "is not a simple product, and
it must not be exploited as a simple service. "I Relying on, as basic
principles, television's special cultural status, its inordinate impact upon
the populace, and its dominant position among differing types of media,
the Charter of Delphes concluded that television should be subjected to

more comprehensive control, including content regulation, and that such
control could exist without violating the restraints placed upon
governmental action in this area in traditionally democratic societies.95
E. The "Television Without Frontiers"Directive

The programming quota came to life in Community legislation in the
form of a directive adopted by the Council of Ministers on October 3,
1989.96 Despite the lengthy history and approval of programming quotas
that existed-in the Television Convention and the Charter-the road

93. Kaplan, supra note 57, at 282.
94. Charter of Delphes, supra note 43, art. 1 at 53. The European Court of Justice
has determined that the transmission of a television broadcast through hertzian signals
constitutes a service within the context of the European Economic Community Treaty.
See Case 155/73, State v. Sacchi, 1974 E.C.R. 409, 427, 14 C.M.L.R. 177 (1974), aff'd
in Case 52/79, Procureur du Roi v. Marc J.V.C. Debauve, 1980 E.C.R. 833, 835, 31
C.M.L.R. 362 (1981). The European Court of Justice has reached the same conclusion
with regard to television signals transmitted by cable or satellite broadcast. See Case
352/85, Bond van Adverteerders v. Netherlands, 1988 E.C.R. 2085, 56 C.M.L.R. 113
(1988).
95. Kaplan, supra note 57, at 282.
96. Directive, supra note 48. For a thorough summary of the Directive, see Kaplan,
supra note 56, at 284-94. See also Vincent B. Feher, "Television Without Frontiers":
Possible U.S. Responses, 9 U. MIAMI ENT. & SPORTS L. REv. 65, 67-73 (1992);
Timothy M. Lupinacci, 77e Pursuit of Television BroadcastingActivities in the European
Community: CulturalPreservationor Economic Protectionism?, 24 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L
L. 113, 118-25 (1991); and Suzanne M. Schwarz, Television Without Frontiers?,16 N.C.
J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 351, 351-57 (1991).
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leading to the enactment of the Directive and the harmonization of
television broadcasting and regulation in the Community was far from
smooth. As previously noted, the initial draft of the Directive was
proposed by the Council of Ministers in April, 1986. 97 The Proposed
Directive created a preference for Community-produced television through
the imposition of a quota 98 reserving thirty percent of programming time
for Community works, not including news, sporting events, game shows,
advertising, or teletext services. 99 The Community broadcasting quota was
to increase to sixty percent of total transmission time by December,
1992. 100

France, historically a strong supporter of European programming, was
the chief proponent of the sixty percent Community-based programming
quota contained within the Proposed Directive."' The Proposed Directive
proved to be unpopular and was opposed by numerous member as well as
nonmember states, including the United States. As a result of this
opposition, the Community encountered serious delays in the amendment
and enactment of the Proposed Directive. It did not receive serious
legislative attention until January, 1988, when the European Parliament
voted in favor of the Proposed Directive."0 2
Despite the European Parliament's adoption of the Proposed
Directive, it continued to receive substantial opposition from the Council
of Ministers, with six of the twelve member states rejecting it outright.103
The member states' objections were many and varied. For example, the
97. Proposed Directive, supra note 37, at 4.
98. Id. art. 2 at 4.
99. Id.
100. Id. The quota provision of the Council's proposal provided, in part, that
1.
Member States shall ensure that internal broadcasters of television reserve
at least 30% of their programming time not consisting of news, sporting events
and game shows, advertising or teletext services for broadcasts of Community
works within the meaning of Article 4 ....
2.
This percentage shall be progressively increased to reach 60% after the
expiry of three years from the date specified [by the European Commission].
Id.
101. Rone Tempest, France Wants to Slam Europe's Open Door to U.S. TV, L.A.
TIMES, Apr. 12, 1989, pt. 6, at 1. See also Paul Presburger & Michael R. Tyler,
Television Without Frontiers: Opportunity and Debate Created by the New European
Community Directive, 13 HAsTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 495, 499 (1990).
102. European ParliamentVotes for Europe-Wide Television, Reuter Lib. Rep., Jan.
20, 1988, available in LEXIS, World Library, TXTNWS File.
103. European T. V. Plan Rejected, N.Y. TIMES, June, 15, 1989, at D2.
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United Kingdom and West Germany objected to the proposal as an
impermissible encroachment upon national sovereignty, and upon the
further ground that the Community was incompetent to regulate cultural
affairs." ° West Germany and the United Kingdom were joined in the
latter objection by the Netherlands, which opposed the proposal based
upon principles of freedom of expression."'5 Denmark, Ireland, and
Portugal objected to the proposal on the basis of their underdeveloped
audiovisual industries, which they believed would be overwhelmed by an
influx of programming from member states with highly developed
Conversely, France and Belgium strongly
audiovisual industries." °
supported the proposal and the need for a strict Community broadcasting
quota.' O7 Other member states argued that amendments purporting to
weaken the proposal by making compliance mandatory only where
practicable and omitting enforcement measures should be rejected. 08
It was only after considerable legislative bloodletting and the exertion
of pressure on France to moderate its views that the Directive received the
final approval of the Council. 0 9 The Directive, as adopted, differed from
the initial draft in several respects. Most significantly, the Community
programming quota had been changed to a European programming quota
and had been reduced to a majority of programming time. Additionally,
compliance with the quota was now only required "where practicable. 1 0
Despite these compromise provisions, the vote of the member states upon
the Directive was not unanimous. Belgium and Denmark held their
respective ground and, as a result, the Directive was approved by a vote
of ten to two."'
The Directive is a truly enigmatic piece of legislation. Despite the
imposition of explicit content regulation, the Directive purports to have as
one of its purposes the protection of freedom of expression from abusive
104. Transatlantic Television; Buddy, can you spare a reel?, ECONOMIST, Aug. 19,
1989, at 56 [hereinafter Buddy, can you spare a reel?].
105. EC Ministers Reject Calls to Limit Imports of TV Programmes, Reuter Lib. Rep.,
Feb. 27, 1989, available in LEXIS, World Library, TXTNWS File.

106. Id.
107. Feher, supra note 96, at 75.
108. EC Attacks French, Dutch and Belgian TV Restrictions, Reuter Lib. Rep., July
19, 1989, available in LEXIS, World Library, TXTNWS File.
109. Steven Greenhouse, Europe Reaches TV Compromise; U.S. Officials Fear
Protectionism, N.Y. TIMEs, Oct. 4, 1989, at Al.
110. Directive, supra note 48, art. 4(1) at 26.
111. Greenhouse, supra note 109; see also Bruce Alderman, Quid Pro Quota?,
VARIETY, Oct. 11-17, 1989, at 51, 63.
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and restrictive practices resulting from the creation of dominant positions
within the television industry."12 Additionally, the Directive purports to
ensure "the independence of cultural development in the member states
and the preservation of cultural diversity in the Community. "' The chief
means by which these purposes are to be achieved is the imposition of a
quota upon Community television broadcasts.
The quota placed upon Community television broadcasts requires
member states to ensure that "where practicable and by appropriate means,
.. . broadcasters reserve for European works, within the meaning of
Article 6, a majority proportion of their transmission time, excluding the
time appointed to news, sports events, games, advertising, and teletext
services." 1 4 The quota is to be achieved progressively, state-by-state,
having due regard for "the broadcaster's informational, educational,
cultural and entertainment responsibilities to its viewing public.""' 5 A
member state that is unable to achieve the transmission time allocation
required by the Directive must ensure that the European content of its
television broadcasting does not fall below its average for 1988.116
Considerable controversy exists as to whether the t988 minimum content
requirement is based upon standards established by each individual
television channel or upon broadcasting, as a whole, throughout the
member state.1 7 Conversely, member states are also permitted under the
Directive to enact quotas requiring higher percentages of European
broadcasting within their jurisdictions." 8
In addition to requiring the imposition of the programming quota, the
Directive also contains substantial reporting requirements. Every two
years, each member state is required to report its progress toward
achievement of the complete implementation of the quota.'1 9 Each
member state's report must include a statistical analysis of its television
112. Directive, supra note 48, pmbl. at 24.

113. Id.
114. Id. art. 4(1) at 26.
115. Id.
116. Id. art. 4(2) at 26.
117. See Schwarz, supra note 96, at 355. As Schwarz notes, the drafters of the
Directive intended this section to mean that a channel which is unable to comply with the
quota requirement of the Directive cannot fall below its 1988 average; however, the
Directive as drafted may require such channels to meet the 1988 European content average
throughout the entire member state. Id. See also Bruce Alderman, EC Quota Vote Oct.
3; Yank FalloutMinimal, VAIETY, Sept. 27-Oct. 3, 1989, at 4.

118. Directive, supra note 48, art. 3(1) at 26.
119. Id. art. 4(3) at 27.
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programming for purposes of determining compliance with the quota, as
well as an explanation of any reason for failure to achieve the required
European content level. 20 Furthermore, the report must contain a
proposed course of action by the state to fully enforce the Directive.' 2 '
These reports are to be submitted to the European Commission, which is
responsible for circulating reports to member states and the European
Parliament and formulating any opinions or recommendations it deems
appropriate.
Controversy arose over whether the Directive was legally binding on
the member states. Some commentators viewed the Directive as simply
a statement of political goals with no legal force or effect. These
commentators pointed to an interpretive declaration issued by the Council
of Ministers at the time the Directive was enacted. 22 In the interpretive
declaration, made at the request of West Germany, the Council held that
the quota was purely a political obligation. 23 These commentators were
also quick to point out that the Directive simply required the imposition
of quotas "where practicable. " 24 As such, the assumption was made that
where it was not practicable to impose the quota required under the
Directive, a member state was free to ignore the Directive's mandates
regarding the quota. Additionally, because the quota is to be achieved
progressively, member states have considerable discretion as to the
timetable for its complete implementation.' 25 Finally, these commentators
26
noted that the Directive itself contained no penalty provisions. 1
Other commentators viewed the Directive as a legally binding
This belief was primarily based upon the reporting
obligation.
allowed the European Commission to monitor compliance
that
requirement
and to exert pressure upon member states reluctant to comply with the
Directive's obligations.127 Pressure could also be exerted on noncomplying
member states by other member states and the European Parliamert, which

120. Id.
121. Id.
122. See Peter Truell, U.S. CriticizesEC Over Issue of TV, Seeks Arbitration, WALL
ST. J., Oct. 11, 1989, §1, at 14. See also EC Adopts Quota Directive; To Take Effect in
18 Months, VARIETY, Oct. 4-10, 1989, at 2.
123. ECAdopts Quota Directive, supra note 122, at 2.
124. Id.; see Directive, supra note 48, art. 4(1) at 26.
125. Id.
126. Kaplan, supra note 57, at 289.
127. Directive, supra note 48, art. 4(3) at 27.
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are required under the Directive to receive a copy of each state's report.12 8
Commentators who view the Directive as creating a binding obligation
upon the member states also pointed to Article 189 of the European
Economic Community Treaty, which provides, in part, that "[a] directive
to be achieved, upon each Member State
shall be binding, as to the1 result
29
to which it is addressed."
Finally, controversy also arose over the definition of what constituted
a "European Work" for purposes of implementation of the quota. The
extremely cumbersome definition of a European Work contained within
Article 6 of the Directive1 3" creates the possibility of substantial confusion

128. Id.

129. TREATY ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN EcoNormc COMMUNITY [EEC TREATY]
art. 189(3).
130. Directive, supra note 48, art. 6 at 27. Article 6 defines European works as
follows:
1. Withinx the mei~iog af this chaptev, 'Er<pea warks' means the
following:
(a)

(b)

(c)

2.

The works referred to in paragraph l(a) and (b) are works mainly made
with authors and workers residing in one or more States referred to in
paragraph l(a) and (b) provided that they comply with one of the three
following conditions:
(a)
(b)
(c)

3.

works originating from Member States of the Community and, as
regards television broadcasters falling within the jurisdiction of the
Federal Republic of Germany, works from German territories
where the Basic Law does not apply and fulfilling the conditions of
paragraph 2;
works originating from European third States party to the European
Convention on Transfrontier Television of the Council of Europe
and fulfilling conditions of paragraph 2;
works originating from other European third countries and fulfilling
the conditions of paragraph 3.

they are made by one or more producers established in one or more
of those States; or
production of the works is supervised and actually controlled by one
or more producers established in one or more of those States; or
the contribution of co-producers of those States to the total coproduction costs is preponderant and the co-production is not
controlled by one or more producers established outside those
States.

The works referred to in paragraph l(c) are works made exclusively or
in co-production with producers established in one or more Member State
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in its application. The definition does not focus on the content of the
work but on the identity and nationality of the producer and the cast, and
the location of the production." As a result, a fictional story set in Japan
but produced by a German national would qualify as a European work.
Likewise, a production about life in America that features Community
nationals as cast members could also qualify as a European work. Finally,
an episode of an American television program with an American producer
and featuring American actors could qualify as a European work if it was
filmed on location in Europe. The anomalous possibilities that may result
from the literal application of the Directive to works such as those
described would do little to further the purported purpose of the Directive
to protect and preserve European culture.
Unfortunately, seemingly lost in the controversy surrounding the
enactment and implementation of the Directive was the issue of its
compatibility with the member states' obligations existing under various
international and regional human rights instruments. Any discussion of
this issue at the member state level appeared as only incidental or
tangential to far deeper discussions concerning the economic and cultural
motivations behind the Directive. If consideration of this issue occurred
in any great detail, it appears that the majority of member states weighed
the options and decided to forego raising issues of freedom of expression
and access to information in order to address more immediate economic
and cultural considerations. This apparent lack of consideration for human
rights standards is clearly a setback for European television viewers at the
dawning of an era in which the exchange of information on a global basis
and exposure to differing cultural viewpoints is crucial.

[sic] by producers established in one or more European third countries
with which the Community will conclude agreements in accordance with
the procedures of the Treaty, if those works are mainly made with
authors or workers residing in one or more European States.
4.

Works which are not European works within the meaning of paragraph
1, but made mainly with authors and workers residing in one or more
Member States, shall be considered to be European works to an extent
corresponding to the proportion of the contribution of Community coproducers to the total production costs.

id.
131. Feher, supra note 96, at 69.
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III. THE APPLICATION OF INTERNATIONAL AND REGIONAL
HUMAN RIGHTS INSTRUMENTS
The Directive violates several international and regional human rights
instruments. These human rights instruments can be placed in three
separate classifications. The first classification consists of the three
instruments constituting the International Bill of Rights,"' specifically, the
Universal Declaration, the CP Covenant, and the ESC Covenant. The
second classification consists of the European Convention, the principal
regional human rights instrument applicable in Europe and binding upon
all member states. The third classification consists of human right
instruments arising from the Conference on Security and Cooperation in
Europe, specifically, the Helsinki Accords, the Copenhagen Document,
and the Charter of Paris. This section analyzes the Directive pursuant to
each of these human rights instruments in greater detail.
A. The InternationalBill of Rights
The International Bill of Rights' founding document is the Universal
Declaration. It consists of a "laundry list" of basic human rights that the
founding members of the United Nations deemed fundamental in the
immediate post-World War II era. The civil and political rights set forth
in the Universal Declaration are given greater expression in the CP
Covenant. More controversial and less subject to governmental protection,
the economic, social, and cultural rights set forth in the Universal
Declaration receive their specific description and implementation in the
The restraints placed upon Community television
ESC Covenant.
programming in the Directive violate all three of these human rights
instruments.
1. The Universal Declaration
The Universal Declaration was adopted by the United Nations General
It is clear that the member states of
Assembly on December 10, 1948.'
the United Nations, in adopting the Universal Declaration, did not intend
to create a binding instrument. 3 4 Rather, the drafters intended the
132. The three documents commonly referred to as the International Bill of Rights
include the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 10, the ESC Covenant,
supra note 11, and the CP Covenant, supra note 12.
133. Universal Declaration, supra note 10.
134. Stephen Raube-Wilson, 7he New World Information and Communication Order
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Universal Declaration to establish a set of common human rights for all
peoples that member states were to recognize, observe, and progressively
Given the political realities necessary to
implement in their policies.'
achieve compromise and agreement on a universally recognized list of
human rights, and the nonbinding nature of the document, the human
rights listed in the Universal Declaration are described in general terms
with little substantive elaboration. Nonetheless, one may view the rights
set forth in the Universal Declaration as a global benchmark for judging
the actions and policies of states that subscribe to its standards.
The Universal Declaration clearly establishes the right of all persons
to freedom of opinion and expression. 36 This right is deemed to include
the "freedom to hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive
and impart information and ideas through any media and regardless of
frontiers. "137 Although this freedom is not further elaborated upon in the
Universal Declaration, it is subject, under Article 29(2), to limited
derogation "for the purpose of securing due recognition and respect for the
rights and freedoms of others and of meeting the just requirements of
morality, public order and the general welfare in a democratic society.
2. The CP Covenant
The Universal Declaration was implemented in a binding fashion in
the CP and ESC Covenants. The CP Covenant was adopted as a
resolution of the United Nations General Assembly on December 16,
1966.'
The Covenant entered into force and effect on March 23,

and InternationalHuman Rights Law, 9 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 107, 116 (1986)
(citing SIR HERSCH LAUTERPACHT, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND HUMAN RIGHTS 397
(1968)). Some commentators contend, however, that the Universal Declaration is a
binding instrument on the basis of its alleged universal acceptance as customary
international law or due to its perceived role in implementing the human rights obligations
set forth in Articles 55 and 56 of the United Nations Charter. See Thomas Buergenthal,
The Right to Receive Information Across National Boundaries, in CONTROL OF THE
DIRECT BROADCAST SATELLITE: VALUES IN CONFLICT 73 (1974).
135. Universal Declaration, supra note 10, at pmbl.
136. Id. at art. 19.
137. Id.
138. Id. at art. 29(2).
139. CP Covenant, supra note 12.
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1976.140 With the exception of Greece, all current and pending members
41
of the European Union are subscribing parties to the CP Covenant.'
The binding nature of the CP Covenant upon signatory parties is
beyond dispute. The CP Covenant is clearly a treaty obligation having
legal force and effect and has been treated as such by signatory states.
Additionally, the CP Covenant has an elaborate enforcement mechanism.
It is thus the binding implementation of the civil and political rights
contained within the Universal Declaration.
The ancestry of the CP Covenant from the Universal Declaration is
clearly apparent in Article 19, relating to freedom of expression, which is
almost identical to its counterpart in the Universal Declaration.
Specifically, Article 19(2) provides that "[elveryone shall have the right
to freedom of expression."' 42 This right includes, as it does in the
Universal Declaration, the "freedom to seek, receive and impart
information and ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers, either orally, in
writing or in print, in the form of art, or through any other media of his
choice.'1 43 Implicit in this guarantee is that the content or origin of the
information or ideas is irrelevant to the creation or exercise of these
freedoms. Any doubts as to the applicability of the Universal Declaration
to the then relatively new technology of television were resolved in the late
1940s by the reference in the CP Covenant to all forms of media.'"
The CP Covenant does differ from the Universal Declaration in the
derogation clause contained within Article 19(3). 41 While the CP
Covenant maintains the exception to freedom of expression for the
protection of morals, public order, and the reputation of others, it adds
another exception for national security.14 The CP Covenant also provides
a standard of review for any such restrictions. Specifically, it provides
that restrictions "shall only be such as are provided by law," requiring
legal action by the state prior to derogation. 11 1Furthermore, the
restrictions must be "necessary," implying at least a rational relationship
must exist between the restriction and the purported reason for the same. 148
140. See supra note 21.
141. Id.
142. CP Covenant, supra note 12, at art. 19(2).
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id. at art. 19(3).
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id.

19961

NO PLACE FOR MELROSE

3. The ESC Covenant
The other covenant implementing the Universal Declaration is the
ESC Covenant. 49 The ESC Covenant was adopted as a resolution by the
United Nations General Assembly on December 16, 1966 and entered into
force on January 3, 1976.150 All members of the European Union have
ratified the ESC Covenant.151
The ESC Covenant differs considerably from the CP Covenant.
Initially, it must be noted that there is considerable controversy over the
definition and very existence of economic, social, and cultural rights.
Furthermore, it is unclear whether the ESC Covenant creates binding
obligations upon signatory states or only constitutes a statement of
aspirations to be achieved in a progressive manner. Finally, unlike the CP
Covenant, the ESC Covenant contains no enforcement mechanism. The
controversy surrounding these issues has led many states, including the
United States, to refuse to ratify the ESC Covenant.
The ESC Covenant also does not directly address the issue of freedom
of expression and access to information. Rather, the ESC Covenant
addresses the right to cultural development and preservation. Specifically,
the Preamble and Article 1 recognize the right of all peoples to cultural
development. 5 2 This right receives further elaboration in Article 15.
Article 15(1) recognizes the right of all persons to participate in cultural
life.1 53 In order to fully realize this right, signatory states are instructed
to take all steps necessary for the "conservation, . . . development and
• . . diffusion of. . . culture."' 54 Signatory states are also instructed to
"respect the freedom indispensable for . . . creative activity."55 Finally,

in Article 15(4), signatory states agree to "recognize the benefits to be
derived from the encouragement and development of international contacts
and cooperation in the scientific and cultural fields. "156
Article 15 of the ESC Covenant creates considerable tension between
the right of a state to preserve its culture and the rights of its citizens to
benefit from the exchange of information through international cooperation
149. ESC Covenant, supra note 11.
150. Id.
151. See supra note 21.

152. ESC Covenant, supra note 11, at pmbl., art. 1.
153. Id. at art. 15(1)(a).
154. Id. at art. 15(2).
155. Id. at art. 15(3).
156. Id. at art. 15(4).
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and contacts. Article 15 protects the right of a signatory state to preserve
and develop its culture. 57 However, it also requires the state to respect
the right of individuals to engage in creative activities."5 8 Finally, Article
15 encourages the development of international cultural contacts. "9 These
rights may conceivably conflict in a state seeking to preserve its cultural
heritage through the restriction of international contacts with other states
and persons which are deemed to be cultural contaminants. The ESC
Covenant offers no guidance as to how such a conflict is to be resolved.
This apparent dichotomy of rights contained within Article 15 of the
ESC Covenant has led some commentators to abstain from attempting to
resolve conflicts between cultural rights and the right to freely impart and
receive information. 160 However, the author suggests that this conflict
may be resolved through the application of rules of statutory interpretation.
In this vein, it may be concluded that the United Nations General
Assembly did not intend to create conflicting rights when it adopted the
resolution endorsing both the CP and ESC Covenants. This is particularly
true as these Covenants were adopted by the General Assembly in the
same resolution, on the same day. As such, it is reasonable to conclude
that the CP and ESC Covenants must be read and interpreted as consistent
with one another.
The CP Covenant clearly creates a right to seek, receive and impart
information regardless of frontiers or the media utilized. 16' The ESC
Covenant clearly creates a right to the enjoyment and preservation of one's
cultural heritage. 162 However, the ESC Covenant also implicitly
recognizes the freedom of expression set forth in the CP Covenant by
requiring freedom for creative activity and encouraging international
contacts and cooperation in the cultural arena. 163 Read and interpreted
consistently, Article 19 of the CP Covenant and Article 15 of the ESC
Covenant recognize the same right to freedom of expression.
It is important to note, however, that the ESC Covenant contains no
specific derogation clause whereas the CP Covenant specifically lists those
instances wherein states may limit the exercise of freedom of expression.'64
157. Id. at art. 15(2).
158. Id. at art. 15(3).
159. Id. at art. 15(4).
160. See Feher, supra note 96, at 113.
161. CP Covenant, supra note 12, at art. 19.
162. ESC Covenant, supra note 11, at art. 15.
163. Id. at art. 15(4).
164. CP Covenant, supra note 12, at art. 19(3).
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The specific derogation clause contained in the CP Covenant may be read
into the ESC Covenant which contains no such derogation clause.
Alternatively, the recognition and protection of cultural rights contained
in the ESC Covenant may be included as an additional exception to the
right of freedom of expression contained in the CP Covenant. Under the
latter approach, states may derogate the right to freedom of expression
contained in the CP Covenant for purposes of cultural preservation.
However, this exception would be subject to the same standard of review
set forth in the CP Covenant (and absent from the ESC Covenant). Any
such restriction would have to be necessary and would require a lawful act
of the state. In effect, there would have to exist at least a rational
between the restriction and the purported reason for the
relationship
165
same.

Reviewing the Directive in light of the freedoms and derogations
contained within the International Bill of Rights, it may be concluded that
there is only one potentially valid basis for the derogation created by the
Directive's programming quota. It is clear that all citizens of the member
states that have ratified the Bill of Rights' instruments have a right to
freely seek, receive, and impart information and ideas regardless of
content or source of origin. Furthermore, it cannot be seriously disputed
that television is within the meaning of the term "media" as utilized in the
Universal Declaration and the CP Covenant. The quota imposed under the
Directive clearly discriminates against television programming from nonEuropean sources. This discrimination is based upon both the allegedly
damaging content of non-European programming and its non-European
origin. The Directive therefore, on its face, violates the right to freedom
of expression as guaranteed in the International Bill of Rights.
Notwithstanding the fact that a violation exists, it must be determined
whether any of the derogations upon the exercise of freedom of expression
provided for in the International Bill of Rights are applicable. In this
regard, several of the bases for derogation may be easily eliminated. For
example, it cannot be contended that the Directive is necessitated by the
existence of a "public emergency which threatens the life of the nation and
the existence of which [has been] officially proclaimed," and that 166a
derogation is therefore permitted under Article 4 of the CP Covenant.
The presence of non-European sources of information certainly do not
threaten the very existence of any member state. Furthermore, the
Directive is not a derogation necessary to protect national security or

165. Id.
166. Id. at art. 4.
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public health as permitted under the Universal Declaration and the CP
Covenant. 167 The Directive is also not a permitted derogation under the
CP Covenant as necessary to protect the reputation of others.16
The Directive cannot be justified on the basis of protection of the
general welfare in a democratic society as provided for in the Universal
Declaration.169 The phrase "general welfare in a democratic society" is
much too vague to provide a useful basis upon which the specific
requirements of the Directive may be judged. Additionally, it can hardly
be argued that the imposition of content and geographic restrictions on the
free exchange of information comports with the general welfare of a
democratic society. Rather, the free exchange of information and ideas is
one of the cornerstones of a truly democratic society.
Finally, as has been aptly noted by other commentators, it cannot be
seriously argued that "exposure to American culture [or any other culture
for that matter] is a threat to fundamental [European] moral precepts or
encourages [European viewers] to undertake fatal habits.""7" The only
remaining valid justification under the International Bill of Rights for the
blatant content and geographic discrimination in the Directive's
programming quota is the preservation of Europe's cultural heritage. The
viability of this justification will be dealt with at length in Section IV of
this article.
B. The European Convention
The European Convention is the primary regional human rights
instrument in Europe. 1 7' The European Convention was executed on
November 4, 1950 and entered into force on September 3, 1953.172 All
members of73 the European Union are parties to the European
Convention.
Like the instruments of the International Bill of Rights, the European
Convention protects freedom of expression. 74 Freedom of expression is

167. Universal Declaration, supra note 10, at art. 29(2). See also CP Covenant, supra
note 12, at art. 19(3)(b).
168. CP Covenant, supra note 12, at art. 19(3)(a).
169. Universal Declaration, supra note 10, at art. 29(2).
170. Feher, supra note 96, at 110.
171.

European Convention, supra note 17, at 221-22.

172. See supra note 17.
173. Id.
174. European Convention, supra note 17, art. 10(1) at 230.
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defined in Article 10(1) of the European Convention to include the right
to "hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas without
interference by public authority and regardless of frontiers. "175 Television
broadcasts are clearly a means of receiving and imparting information
within the parameters of Article 10(1), which further provides that
member states may require the licensing of7 6broadcasting, television, or
cinema enterprises within their boundaries.
The European Convention, like the instruments of the International
Bill of Rights, permits a signatory state to restrict the exercise of freedom
The exercise of freedom of
of expression within its boundaries.
expression may be restricted in order to serve
the interests of national security, territorial integrity or public
safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, the protection of
health or morals, for the protection of the reputation or the rights
of others, for preventing the disclosure of information received
in confidence, or for maintaining the authority and impartiality
of the judiciary.' 77

Thus, the potential restrictions a state may place on the exercise of the
freedom of expression pursuant to the European Convention are broader
than those which may be imposed upon this freedom pursuant to the
International Bill of Rights. However, such limitations must be prescribed
by law and be necessary for the maintenance of a democratic society.' 78
These conditions require that at least a rational relationship exist between
the restraint placed by the state upon the exercise of the right to freedom
of expression and the purported reason justifying such restraint.
Furthermore, it is important to note that Article 10 of the European
Convention does not contain any reference to derogation from the right of
freedom of expression for the purpose of protecting or preserving the
cultural heritage of subscribing states.
Despite the differences that exist between the European Convention
and the International Bill of Rights, an analysis of the Directive's
programming quota leads, as it does under the Bill of Rights, to the
conclusion that the quota is an impermissible derogation of the freedom of
expression. As a general matter, content and geographic discrimination

175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Id. art. 10(2) at 230.
178. Id.
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are inconsistent with the principles underlying a democratic society. Even
assuming that the member states could satisfy their burden and
demonstrate that the quota imposed under the Directive is necessary to
maintain a democratic society, the member states would clearly be unable
to satisfy the substantive bases under which derogation from the right of
freedom of expression is permissible. The Directive is not necessitated by
national security, the preservation of the territorial integrity of any state,
public safety, the prevention of public disorder or crime, the protection of
public health, the protection of the rights and reputation of others, the
prevention of the disclosure of confidential information, or for the
maintenance of judicial authority and impartiality as set forth in Article
10(2). 179
This leaves as the sole basis for justification of the Directive's quota
the protection of public morality. Any connection between the exposure
to foreign culture and a decline in fundamental European moral precepts
(if, in fact, there is such a decline) is, at best, tenuous and would be
difficult to establish. Given that the Directive's programming quota does
not fit within any of the permissible grounds for derogation set forth in
Article 10(2), it is reasonable to conclude that the quota and the resulting
content and geographic discrimination violate Article 10(1) of the
European Convention, guaranteeing the freedom to receive and impart
information and ideas without governmental interference and regardless of
frontiers.
C. The Conference on Cooperation and Security in Europe
In addition to the European Convention, there are several other human
rights instruments guaranteeing freedom of expression and the right to
receive and impart infomation and ideas throughout Europe. These
instruments arise from the Conference on Cooperation and Security in
Europe, which was concluded in Helsinki, Finland, on August 1, 1975,
and consist of the Helsinki Accords, 8 ' the Copenhagen Document, 8 ' and
the Charter of Paris. 82 The following sections examine the compatibility
of the Directive with the content and the protections of each of these
documents.

179. Id.
180. Helsinki Accords, supra note 22, at 1292.
Copenhagen Document, supra note 27.
182. Charter of Paris, supra note 28.
181.
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1. The Helsinki Accords
The Helsinki Accords were ratified at the conclusion of the
Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe in August, 1975.183
All members of the European Union were parties to the Conference and
the Helsinki Accords."' The Helsinki Accords were designed to reduce
tension throughout Europe resulting from the superpower conflict in the
Cold War and facilitate the free flow of information and peoples between
the free world and those states behind the Iron Curtain. The freedom to
receive and impart information thus plays a central role in the Helsinki
Accords.
The Helsinki Accords address the freedom of expression in both a
general and specific manner. The participating states that ratified the
Helsinki Accords first expressed their recognition of "the universal
significance of human rights and fundamental freedoms." 185 The
participating states also pledged to promote universal respect for human
rights and fundamental freedoms." 6 The participating states further agreed
to "act in conformity with the purposes and principles of .

.

. the

Universal Declaration of Human Rights"' 87 and "fulfill their obligations as
set forth in the international declarations and agreements in [the human
rights field], including inter alia the international covenants on human
rights, by which they may be bound." 8 Thus, by implication, the
participating states agreed to recognize and respect the right of freedom of
expression as contained within the International Bill of Rights.
The Helsinki Accords also address the freedom of expression more
specifically. The signatories expressed their recognition of "the need for
an ever wider knowledge and understanding of the various aspects of life
in other participating states" and "the importance of dissemination of
information from other participating states."" g9 Television was recognized
as having a fundamental and essential role in the exchange of information
and knowledge and the fostering of understanding between states.' 9 ° The
participating states pledged to promote the improvement of the
183. See supra note 22.
184. Id.
185. Helsinki Accords, supra note 22, § l(a)(VIl) at 1295.
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. Id. § 2 at 1315.
190. Id. § 2(b) at 1316-17.
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dissemination of filmed and broadcast information among themselves.191
In order to accomplish these goals, the participating states agreed to
"encourage a wider showing of broadcasting of a greater variety of
recorded and filmed information from other participating States . . .and
facilitate the import by competent organizations . . . of recorded

audiovisual material from other participating States.""
The quota imposed by the Directive flies directly in the face of the
commitments made by the participating states to the Helsinki Accords. As
previously discussed, the Directive may be viewed as violating all three
Adoption and
instruments of the International Bill of Rights.
implementation of the Directive's quota therefore contravenes the pledge
of the participating states to the Helsinki Accords to conduct themselves
in conformance with the International Bill of Rights. The participating
states pledged in the Helsinki Accords to improve the dissemination of
Although the
filmed and broadcast information among themselves.
Directive's content and geographic discrimination may serve to facilitate
achievement of this goal among European states, the Directive has the
opposite effect with regard to the exchange of information and ideas
between European and non-European states. Finally, the restrictions
contained in the Directive may discourage the import of audiovisual
material from participating states to the Helsinki Accords that are not
members of the European Union.
At least one commentator has thoughtfully noted that the European
Union could mount a credible defense to the use of the Helsinki Accords
to attack the validity of the Directive.193 For example, the European
Union could argue that the Helsinki Accords were not designed to further
ensure or promote freedom of expression but to defuse simmering tension
between the free world and the Soviet bloc during the Cold War. 94
Furthermore, Union member states that are also signatories to the Helsinki
Accords could argue that the accords are not binding and only set forth
guidelines and goals to achieve greater cooperation and understanding
between participating states. The nonbinding nature of the Accords is
evidenced by the absence of enforcement mechanisms. Member states
could also contend that the Directive facilitates a wider exchange of
information by preventing American domination and saturation of the

191. Id. § 2(a)(iii) at 1316.
192. Id.
193. Feher, supra note 96, at 116.
194. Id.
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Under this view, the programming
television programming market.'
restrictions contained within the Directive have the effect of facilitating,
rather than interrupting, the free flow of information between participating
states to the Helsinki Accords.
The Directive may very well survive any attack mounted pursuant to
the Helsinki Accords. From an absolute legal standpoint, the European
Union would probably be correct in its assertion regarding the nonbinding
nature of the Helsinki Accords. However, the Accords themselves could
be interpreted as restating customary international law, and thereby
creating binding obligations upon the participating states. In this regard,
the Helsinki Accords may be deemed to have established an "international
norm among its signatories that the mutual unfettered exchange of
information is necessary to maintain friendly relationships between
nations." 196 If such a norm of customary international law has, in fact,
been established, the Directive should be viewed as violating this stated
norm. At the very least, the Directive violates the spirit underlying the
Helsinki Accords and its protection of free expression and transmission of
information.
2. The Copenhagen Document and the Charter of Paris
The Copenhagen Document is one of a series of instruments adopted
by the Conference on Cooperation and Security in Europe subsequent to
its adoption of the Helsinki Accords. 19 7 The Copenhagen Document was
drafted at a time of great turmoil and strife throughout Europe. The
Berlin Wall had fallen, leaving Germany united in all but name only.
Thoughts of imminent German reunification caused considerable concern
throughout the European continent. Additionally, the Communist regimes
of Eastern Europe had fallen in rapid succession, and each of these states
had begun a slow and tortuous climb to political stability and economic
revitalization. Tensions regarding the Soviet Union's attitude over the loss
of its empire in Eastern Europe and concerns about whether the winds of
change blowing across the Continent would drift as far as the gates of the
Kremlin remained high. It was amid this atmosphere of insecurity and
uncertainty that the participants in the Conference on the Human

195. Id.
196. Id. at 118.
197. Copenhagen Document, supra note 27.
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Dimension of the Conference on Security and Cooperation met in 1990
and drafted the Copenhagen Document. 98
Given the events that were occurring in Europe at the time of the
Conference, the Copenhagen Document is an extraordinary development.
As the participants at the Helsinki Conference had done, the participants
at the Copenhagen Conference restated their commitment to human rights
and fundamental freedoms, including the freedom of expression, on a
general basis by reaffirming their obligations pursuant to the International
Bill of Rights.199 However, what makes the Copenhagen Document truly
extraordinary is its specificity in setting forth the rights and freedoms to
be recognized by the participating states. In this regard, the Copenhagen
Document more closely resembles the European Convention than it does
its direct ancestor, the Helsinki Accords.
Three sections of the Copenhagen Document are particularly relevant
to the issue of freedom of expression through the broadcast media. First,
Article II, Section 9.1 establishes that citizens of the participating states
have a right to freedom of expression and communication. 200 This right
is defined to include the "freedom tW hold opinios and receive and impart
information and ideas without interference by public authority and
regardless of frontiers."01 Article II, Section 9.1 also provides that the
exercise of this right may only be restricted through legal measures
adopted in conformity with international standards.20 2
The exact circumstances in which derogation of the freedom of
expression is permissible are set forth in greater detail in Article II,
Sections 24 and 25. Section 25 is inapplicable to an assessment of the
Directive's programming quota as it relates solely to derogations occurring
pursuant to declared public emergencies and no such emergency has
occurred in any of the member states of the European Union. 20 3 However,
Section 24 does contain circumstances in which derogation is permissible
that are relevant to determining the validity or invalidity of the Directive's
programming quota.
Section 24 of Article II first restates the requirement established in
Section 9.1 of Article II that any restriction imposed upon the exercise of
the human rights and freedoms set forth in the Copenhagen Document be
198. The Copenhagen Document was executed on June 29, 1990. Id.
199. Id. art. I, § 5.20 at 1309.
200. Id. art. II, § 9.1 at 1311.
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. Id. art. II, § 25 at 1316.
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based on a legal enactment by the participating state, in conformity with
its international obligations. 204 Specific reference is made to the
obligations set forth in the CP Covenant and the Universal Declaration. 05
The permissible derogations provided for in these documents are not
recited; however, it may be reasonably concluded that, given the express
language of this section, appropriate reference must be made to these
human rights instruments, depending on which right the state seeks to
restrict, and that the proposed derogation must be one contained in the
applicable instruments.
Closely related to both the Helsinki Accords and the Copenhagen
Document is the Charter of Paris.2"6 Like the Copenhagen Document, the
Charter of Paris was drafted and adopted under much different
circumstances than those that existed at the time the Helsinki Accords
were adopted. By the time the Charter of Paris was adopted, the Cold
War, which had so preoccupied the drafters of the Helsinki Accords, had
ended. The Soviet Union stood on the brink of imminent dissolution,
rendered asunder by political, economic, and ethnic forces that the leaders
in the Kremlin were either unable or unwilling to contain. As its title
indicates, the Charter of Paris was intended to be a blueprint for a truly
new Europe, united in its respect for democratic institutions and peaceful
coexistence and understanding.
In this regard, the Charter of Paris contained important references to
the right of freedom of expression. The participating states specifically
reaffirmed the commitments set forth in the Helsinki Accords.20 7 More
generally, the participating states restated their recognition and respect for
human rights and fundamental freedoms as "essential safeguard[s] against
an over-mighty State." 20 8 The renewed observance of human rights and
fundamental freedoms by the participating states was deemed to be "the
foundation of freedom, justice and peace."209 Included among the rights
to be observed was the right of every individual to freedom of thought and
expression. 210
The issue of whether the Directive violates the Copenhagen Document
Charter of Paris appears to be clearer than the issue of whether it
the
and
204.
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.
210.

Id. art. I, § 24 at 1316.
Id.
Charter of Paris, supra note 28.
d.at 193, 196.
Id. at 193-94.
Id. at 194.
Id.
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violates the Helsinki Accords. The same arguments supporting the
argument that the Directive does not violate the Helsinki Accords may
certainly be utilized to avoid application of the Copenhagen Document and
the Charter of Paris. However, as previously discussed, the Directive
may be found to violate the Universal Declaration and the CP Covenant.
The participating states that adopted the Copenhagen Document expressly
pledged to conform their conduct to these human rights instruments and
refrain from violations in the absence of circumstances permitting
derogation. Any violation of the Universal Declaration or the CP
Covenant therefore constitutes a breach, by implication, of the violating
state's obligations under the Copenhagen Document.
Furthermore, both the Copenhagen Document and the Charter of
Paris, like the Helsinki Accords, establish international norms with regard
to the free exchange of information between participating states that may
be enforceable and binding as customary international law. This argument
is more persuasive as applied to the Copenhagen Document and the
Charter of Paris as each contain further restatements of generally accepted
principles relating to the free exchange of information and ideas across
international borders. The issue of how many times a principle must be
restated before it may be recognized as customary international law is
unclear. However, what is clear is that these rights and freedoms come
closer to achieving the status of customary international law with every
repetition, restatement, and reaffirmation by the participating states.
IV. THE DIRECTIVE AND THE PRESERVATION OF
EUROPEAN CULTURE

As the preceding examination of the Directive has shown, the only
permissible basis for derogation from the right to freely recei've and impart
information, regardless of content and geographic origin, is the
preservation of national culture as provided for in Article 15(2) of the ESC
Not coincidentally, the need to protect and preserve
Covenant."'
European or national culture was the primary argument advanced by
proponents of the Directive throughout the debate regarding its enactment.
The following section of this article examines the cultural preservation
argument, specifically focusing on the issue of whether the Directive's
programming quota requirement reasonably relates to its purported
purpose of preserving European culture.

211. ESC Covenant, supra note 11, at art. 15(2).
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As a preliminary matter, it should be noted that this examination
assumes that the European Union is, in fact, competent to regulate in the
field of cultural affairs. As amply demonstrated in the debates leading to
the enactment of the Directive, this assumption is not without controversy.
However, this issue may be easily resolved once the quota requirement is
recognized as having very little to do with the preservation of European
culture and a great deal to do with economics-a matter clearly within the
jurisdiction of the European Union.212
A. The Content of the Cultural PreservationArgument
A close review of the Directive and its legislative history reveals two
overriding cultural objectives.2"3 First, the Directive was viewed as an
important step in promoting a pan-European culture throughout the
member states. The second purported motivation for the Directive was the
preservation of European and national culture. This preservation effort
was deemed necessary by the Community in light of the perceived flood
of foreign broadcasting material, much of which was deemed
inappropriate, bourgeois, and culturally regressive. The programming
quota was therefore seen as essential to protect the Community viewing
public from unsuitable foreign material.
The Community hoped to utilize the quota requirement contained
within the Directive to promote European culture, as well as the culture
of the various member states.214 The Community believed that television
would play "an important part in developing and nurturing [an] awareness

212. As the European Court of Justice has determined that the transmission of
television signals by means of hertzian, cable, and satellite broadcast is a service within
the meaning of the EEC Treaty, the European Union is competent to legislate and regulate
inthis area pursuant to Articles 3(c), 7a(2), and 59-66 of the EEC Treaty. See supra note
94 (ECJ cases); see also EEC TREATY.
213. This of course assumes that one is able to define the term "culture." As noted
by one commentator, "it is difficult to maintain and promote, let alone define, something
as complex as a 'culture'." Arthur Dimopoulos, The Television Without Frontiers
Directive:Preserving CulturalIntegrity or Protectionism?, 13 Loy. L.A. INT'L & COMP.
L.J. 273, 287 (1993). For purposes of this discussion, the author will adhere to the
definition of culture as "the ideas, customs, skills and arts of a people or group, that are
transferred, communicated, or passed along, as in or to succeeding generations."
WEBSTER'S NEW WORLD DICTIONARY 337 (3d ed. 1988). However, this definition will
be tempered by a recognition that culture is often amorphous and incapable of being
defined or conveyed in any adequate fashion. See Kaplan, supra note 56, at 263.
214. Commission of the European Communities, Toward a Large European AudioVisual Market 6-7 (1988).
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of the rich variety of Europe's common cultural and historical heritage. 215
The Community was of the further belief that the free exchange of
information across European borders envisioned by the Directive could
impress upon the peoples of Europe their common destiny.21 6 It was also
clearly recognized that these goals could not be achieved unless the
Community had substantial control over broadcasting technology.21 7 Upon
achieving such control, it was anticipated that inter-European transmissions
could serve as vehicles for promoting and enriching the cultures of
Europe.21 8 This position was perhaps best articulated by European
Parliament Representative Petronio. During the course of debate on the
Directive in the European Parliament, Representative Petronio stated that
the assertion of greater Community control over television through the
imposition of a programming quota would foster "a culture, a tradition,
a European identity that will, ... as a result of this progressively
increasing European production

. .

.[,] shine forth as a cultural beacon for

21 9
the other parts of the world."
The protection and preservation of European culture, the second
cultural objective of the Directive, was deemed necessary in order to stem
what was perceived to be "an unregulated flood" of American
programming that was alleged to be overwhelming local European
programming. 220 Community bureaucrats expressed fear for Europe's
cultural identity "if audiovisual Europe consists of European consumers
sitting in front of Japanese TV sets showing American programs. ,221 The
continuation of this foreign flood of television programming was equated
by commentators to "cultural suicide" 222 and a surrender to American
cultural imperialism.223

215. Green Paper, supra note 36, at 29.
216. Id.
217. Matteo Maggiore, Audiovisual Production in the Single Market, Study for the
Commission of the European Communities 29, 197 (1990).
218. Green Paper, supra note 36, at 30.
219. Statement of Rep. Petronio, 1989 O.J. (Annex 2-378) 110, 118 (May 24, 1989)
(Debates of the European Parliament).
220. Europe and America Preparefor 1992, BROADCASTING, Apr. 17, 1989, at 35,
38.
221. Daniel Pederson, A 'Grenade'Aimedat Hollywood: Europe Votes to Slap a Quota
on U.S. TV Imports, NEWSWrEK, Oct. 16, 1989, at 58.
222. No Gilligan is an Island, NEw REPUBLIC, Apr. 17, 19S9, at 10.
223. Western Europe: Europeans Agree Need to Boost TV Programme Production,
Reuter Textline, Oct. 2, 1989, available in LEXIS, World Library, TXTNWS File. See
also Mary Ellen Bortin, FranceLaunchesAmerican-Style Drive to Save European Cinema,
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This view was based, in part, upon the belief that much of the foreign
programming broadcast within the Community was nothing more than
"garbage television." 22 4 American television imports were particularly
singled out for castigation and were characterized as "wall-to-wall sitcoms
This programming was attacked as creating an
and soaps.
subculture of poor taste" 226 and
"ostentatious, fake, parasitic, standardized
227

representing "cultural regression.
Heeding the growing criticism of foreign programming, members of
the European Parliament and Council of Ministers concluded that Europe's
cultural heritage was a "victim of increasing Americanization,", 22 and that
immediate action was required to prevent its further deterioration. The
programming quota contained within the Directive was designed to prevent
further homogenization of European and American cultures and reverse the
perceived marginalization of languages and national cultural identities.229
It was believed that the quota would accomplish these goals be preserving
the "richness and diversity of [the European] cultural heritage. ",230 In this
regard, the Directive has been aptly described as an "attempt to inoculate
a society inflicted with foreign ideals and values, a society confronted with
the danger of experiencing irreversible, deeply rooted changes." 23

Reuters Eur. Service, June 21, 1984, availablein LEXIS, World Library, TXTNWS File.
224. By "garbage television," the author is referring to programming with little
instructional or cultural value. See supra note 8 (author's usage of the term "video
trash.")
225. Fortress TV: With PractisedPerversity, Euro-Regulators are Finding a Way to
Stifle Good Television, ECONOMIST, Sept. 10, 1988, at 19.
226. SERGE REGOURD, LA TLItVISION DES EUROPtENS 107-08 (1992).
227. John P. L. Roberts, The Implications of the Globalization of Television and Its
Cultures, 15 CoMM. 213, 223 (1990).
228. Statement of Rep. Kuijpers, 1989 O.J. (Annex 2-378) 110, 120 (May 24, 1989)
(Debates of the European Parliament).
229. Kaplan, supra note 57, at 259.
230. News of the E. C.: Parliament Proposes Amendment to "Television Without
Frontiers," EUROPE, July-Aug. 1989, at 48, 50 (quoting European Parliament
Representative Barzanti).
231. Kaplan, supra note 57, at 256. Not everyone was pleased with the Directive as
finally drafted and enacted by the Council of Ministers and the European Parliament. For
example, in commenting upon the reduction of the European broadcasting quota from sixty
percent to a majority of programming time, European Parliament Representative Schinzel
stated that "our once fine bird with its proud plumage is now a poor thin little thing whose
tatty feathers have been well and truly plucked." Statement of Rep. Schinzel, 1989 O.J.
(Annex 2-378) 110, 113-14 (May 24, 1989) (Debates of the European Parliament).
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B. The Directive: Serving the Needs of European Culture?
Despite its grandiose purpose of protecting and preserving European
culture from further contamination by foreign television broadcasting, the
Directive, as drafted and implemented, fails to accomplish its task. First,
the Directive makes the incorrect assumption that culture flows from
government, rather than the people. In addition, by focusing its attention
primarily on fictional works, the Directive fails to take any action with
regard to equally powerful "foreign contaminants," such as nonfiction and
More generally, the
sports programming, news, and advertising.
Directive fails to recognize that foreign television shows, in particular,
American television shows, are not the most popular shows among
European viewers.23 2 Most Europeans do not find foreign culture, in
particular, American culture, to be a threat to their own distinctive
heritage.233 Problems have arisen in determining compliance with the
Directive's quota as a result of the convoluted definition of "European
Works." The controversial issue of whether the Directive is binding or
nonbinding has also not been fully resolved. The Directive benefits the
cultural heritage of larger member states with developed audiovisual
industries at the expense of smaller member states without such developed
industries. Finally, the Directive impermissibly interferes with each
state's own independent perception of its culture.
An examination of these weaknesses in the Directive and the state of
the European audiovisual industry at the time of its enactment leads to the
inescapable conclusion that the Directive's programming quota is a
protectionist measure, designed to foster growth in the European television
programming industry and allow it to compete in the European
marketplace on a more equal basis with its stronger American and
Japanese counterparts. These purposes of the Directive's quota are not
recognized exceptions for derogation from the right of freedom of
expression set forth in the applicable human rights instruments.
The stated purpose of the Directive is to protect and preserve the
national cultures of the member states and European culture as a whole.
Despite the difficulties inherent in defining the term "culture," there are
clearly identifiable national and regional cultures within the member states.
232. See Michael Tracy, European Viewers: What Will 7hey Really Watch?, COLUM.
J. WORLD Bus., Fall 1987, at 77, 82 [hereinafter European Viewers].
233. See Despite EC Directive, Public Unconcerned With U.S. Media Threat, U.S.
Info. Agency, Aug. 14, 1991, at 3. [hereinafter Despite EC Directive]. But see TV
TatteredNation's Social Fabric,PoliticalScientist Contends, WASH. POST, Sept. 3, 1995,
at AS. [hereinafter TV Tattered Nation's Social Fabric].
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What is less clear is whether a "pan-European culture" exists. Critics of
the Directive may legitimately ask, what is pan-European culture?
Resolution of this issue is crucial as the Directive is designed, in part, to
protect such culture.
One of the inherent weaknesses of the Directive is its assumption that
a homogenous European culture and one viewing audience exists.234
Despite the best efforts of many, pan-European culture and its attributes
Considering the plethora of beliefs, languages,
escape definition.
traditions, and customs of European peoples, it may reasonably be
concluded that most member states would have a difficult time defining
their own national culture let alone "pan-European" culture. Culture
differs from one European state to another, and, due to the patchwork of
peoples present in each state, varies from region to region and town to
town.

When the issue of defining "European culture" was raised during the
debate regarding the adoption of the Directive, the European Parliament
was itself unable to agree upon a definition. The difficulty inherent in this
task was perhaps best summarized by one representative who commented
that "there does exist a single European culture, but it is made up of a
nuance of varieties and differences. It is like a patchwork blanket of
several elements. 235 However, this statement does no more than reflect
what is obvious-national and regional cultures exist within the
Community. The conclusion reached by this representative may be
summarized as a belief in the existence of a single unitary culture which
is capable of recognition but incapable of definition. This "know it when
you see it"236 approach is an inadequate basis for the restrictions upon the
freedom of expression contained within the Directive.
Of course, the inability to define "pan-European" culture does not
mean that such a culture does not exist. The criticism is simply that the
Community adopted protective measures without first defining the subject
matter worthy of such protection. Rather than taking the time necessary

234. See Dimopoulos, supra note 213, at 296, n.139.
235. Remarks of Rep. Kristoffersen, 1989 O.J. (Annex 2-374) 44 (Feb. 14, 1989)
(Debates of the European Parliament).
236. This novel approach to resolving difficult constitutional issues involving vague
terminology was first pronounced by Justice Potter Stewart of the United States Supreme
Court inJacobellisv. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184 (1964). In attempting to define the term "hard
core pornography," Justice Stewart stated, "Ishall not today attempt further to define the
kinds of material I understand to be embraced within that shorthand description; and
perhaps I could never succeed in intelligibly doing so. But I know it when I see it ...
Id. at 197.
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to define the attributes of European culture and the methods by which this
culture could be most efficiently protected and preserved without
infringement upon fundamental human rights, the Community, in its rush
to reach the merits of the perceived crisis, ignored this task. This
oversight, although it would appear to be merely procedural, had a
substantive effect on the meaning and application of the Directive.
Perhaps there in fact is a unitary "pan-European" culture. Whatever that
term may mean and whatever the Directive is in fact attempting to
preserve and protect became lost in the heated rhetoric surrounding the
debate on the quota issue. Truly, the Directive cart has been placed
before the cultural horse.
Assuming pan-European culture exists and can be identified, the
Directive makes the erroneous assumption that this or national culture
flows from the government rather than the people. By imposing
programming quotas, the Directive serves as nothing more than a
governmentally-imposed shield designed to "deflect the natural effects of
the free market on culture."'237 Inherent in the Directive is the assumption
that the free marketplace of ideas is too dangerous a place for the average
European to venture, a place where an individual may lose his or her
cultural identity.23 ' To prevent such a loss, members of the Council of
Ministers and the European Parliament have chosen to inoculate their
constituency with a sturdy dose of the culture they were unable to define.
Given the long and tragic history of governmentally-imposed culture in
Europe, especially in this last century, attempts to reestablish
governmental control over culture are truly surprising and alarming. 2 "

237. Roberts, supra note 227, at 218.
238. Remarks of Rep. Vandemeulebroucke, 1989 O.J. (Annex 2-374) 43 (Feb. 14,
1989) (Debates of the European Parliament). Rep. Vandemeulebroucke stated that, as
"motion pictures and television play an essential role in the preservation of the diversity
of cultural identity, . . . [it [is] ... dangerous, when discussing movies and television
programming, to focus too much on opening up to the free market." Id. Professor
Robert D. Putnam of Harvard University has concluded that the introduction of television
in the 1950s profoundly undermined civic culture in the United States. TV Tattered
Nation's Social Fabric,supra note 233. Professor Putnam found a negative correlation
between the number of hours an individual watches television and both the number of
groups the individual joins and his or her level of social trust. Id. Professor Putnam
concludes that television is a major factor in the decline of two crucial ingredients of
democratic society in the United States, specifically, social trust and group participation.
Id.
239. Ofparticular relevance are the eloquent comments of Lord Kilbrandon, addressing
the issue of governmentally-imposed culture.
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Culture flows not from government but from the people
themselves-their beliefs, traditions, customs, and languages. Culture
cannot be legislated or dictated by governmental decree. It is "a reflection
of ideas and choices of [the] citizens [themselves]."240 Culture does not
belong to the government but to the citizenry which shapes it and gives it
Governmental regulation of culture deprives
form and substance. 4
citizens of free choice and implicitly tells them that the government knows
more than the people about their nation's past, current, and future cultural
heritage. 42 Laboring under the yoke of governmentally-imposed culture,
the European citizen is not free to choose his or her own cultural destiny.
Deprived of free selection in the international marketplace of ideas,
"[Eurocitizens] will lose opportunities for choosing the best political and
cultural path for themselves." 243
The Directive clearly expresses governmental mistrust of the
European citizenry's ability to make the correct choices with regard to its
cultural destiny. Implicit in the lack of trust European politicians have in
their constituencies is the belief that the more Europeans are exposed to
foreign culture through the media, "the less motivated they are to defend
their national and European cultural identities, and the more defenseless
they become." 2" Presented in this manner, the choice became obvious to

Let us go forward [to a time] when programmes. . . will be receivable
from satellites without relay in every home. No country will make penal laws
against the reception of foreign programmes, because they could no more
enforce such laws than could Nazi Germany . . . . Let us acknowledge here
and now that there is no prospect of international agreement on the intellectual
or cultural quality of this, or any other mass medium. Everyone will receive
what anyone transmits.
Lord Kilbrandon, quoted in Eamonn G. Hall & Patrick J.C. McGovern, Regulation of the
Media: Irish and European Community Dimensions, 8 DUBLIN U.L.J. 1, 20-21 (1986).
240. Brian L. Ross, "ILove Lucy," But the European Community Doesn't: Apparent
Protectionism in the European Community's Broadcast Market, 16 BROOK. J. INT'L L.
529, 559 (1990).
241. See Statement of Rep. De Vries, 1989 O.J. (Annex 2-378) 110, 111-12 (May 24,
1989) (Debates of the European Parliament). Representative De Vries stated that "[c]ulture
and information belong to everyone and must not be subject to national quotas." Id.
242. See Jack Valenti, The European Community Makes Ominous Sounds About
BroadcastQuotas, COmm. LAW., Winter 1990, at 3. Mr. Valenti characterized the quota
requirement as "an imperial decree that says to the citizens of each country, 'We public
officials know better than you citizens what you ought to see and you want to see.'" Id.
243. Feher, supra note 96, at 118.
244. Jean-Claude Charra, L'Angleterre contre l'Europe, LIBERATION, Nov. 24, 1993,
at 11.
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most members of the Council of Ministers and the European Parliament.
In order to strengthen European cultural identity and lessen the risk of
"mass Americanization," they chose to limit viewer choice and access to
the alleged foreign contaminants within the media. This dark view of the
average European as a willing participant in the abandonment of hundreds
of years of culture at the flick of a remote control is far too cynical and
elitist to serve as an adequate basis for the limitations placed by the
Directive upon the freedom of expression.
The view of Europeans as victims or potential victims of foreign
programming is not supported by the facts surrounding Europeans'
television viewing habits or perceptions regarding the threat of foreign
programming content. Viewer surveys indicate that the member states and
their citizenry do not believe themselves to be threatened by non-European
television broadcasting.24 Furthermore, foreign programming does not
garner higher ratings than domestically produced programming.246 For
example, recent surveys indicate that in Germany, France, and the United
Kingdom, the vast majority of the top twenty rated television programs
were domestically produced. 247 A recent survey conducted by the United
States Information Agency in France, Germany, Italy, Spain, and the
United Kingdom indicated that the majority of polled citizens did not
perceive American culture as a substantial threat to the European cultural
heritage.24 Ironically, substantial minorities in France and the United
Kingdom felt that greater European integration substantially threatened
their own national cultures.249 The perceived cultural crisis that served as
the primary basis for adopting the Directive appears to have been
exaggerated.

245. See Despite EC Directive, supra note 233.
246. See European Viewers, supra note 232.
247. Id. at 83.
248. Despite EC Directive, supra note 233. Of the member states surveyed, the
United States Information Agency found that the following percentages of the population
did not deem American culture to be a threat to their national cultural identity: France,
61%; Germany, 83%; Italy, 72%; Spain, 63%; and the United Kingdom, 60%. Id. The
percentage for the United Kingdom is somewhat surprising given its strict domestic
broadcasting quotas that require that no more than fourteen percent of domestic
programming originate outside of the country.
See European Community:
Communications Policy Advisory Group Urges Single U.S. Representative to EC on 1992,
Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 6, at 958 (July 19, 1989). But see TV Tattered Nation's
Social Fabric, supra note 233.
249. See Dimopoulos, supra note 213, at 296.
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The results of the survey conducted by the United States Information
Agency, indicating that a substantial minority of Europeans view European
integration as a threat to their national culture, merits further discussion.
One of the purported purposes of the Directive was to protect and preserve
25 0
the national cultures of the member states, as well as European culture.
At the present time, however, the dominant forces in European television
are located in France, Germany, and the United Kingdom.25' Member
states with lesser developed audiovisual industries are fearful that their
national cultural identities will be overwhelmed by those of member states
with more developed audiovisual industries.25 2
There are valid reasons for smaller member states to fear that their
own and European broadcasting markets will be controlled by British,
French, and German produced television programs. Given the exorbitant
cost of production, smaller member states experience little or no
economies of scale in the television programming industry. 253 Because
English, French, and German are the predominant languages within the
Union, television programs produced in countries with small industries and
in secondary languages, such as Danish, Greek, and Portuguese, fare little
chance of competing outside of their own national markets with television
programming produced in one of Europe's primary languages. 254 States
with smaller audiovisual industries may simply find their native cultures
and languages cannot compete outside of their national boundaries.255 The
result will be that the television markets of smaller member states will be
overrun and dominated by English language programs produced in Britain,
French language programs produced in France, and German language
programs produced in Germany. This market domination may discourage
development of the television programming industry within the smaller
member states. 256 Most importantly, national and regional cultures, which
the Directive was allegedly designed to protect, may be subordinated to a
250. See Feher, supra note 96, at 112. See also Kaplan, supra note 57, at 331.
251. See Haydn Shaughnessy & Carmen Fuente Cobo, The Cultural Obligations of
Broadcasting, National and Transnational Legislation Concerning Cultural Duties of
Television Broadcasters in Europe 2 (1990).
252. See Janet L. Conley, Hollywood's Last Hurrah? "Television Without Frontiers"
Directive May Close Borders to the European Community's Broadcast Market, U. PA. J.
INT'L Bus. L., Spring 1993, at 87, 107.
253. See Mark M. Nelson & Peter Truell, Media: Some Support in EC is Seen for TV
Quotas, WALL ST. J., July 10, 1989, at B4.
254. Id.
255. Id.
256. Id.
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"pan-European" culture that, although incapable of definition, bears a
striking resemblance to English, French, and German national cultures.
The Directive also impermissibly interferes with local control of
For example, in Spain, the
national and regional cultures.
Communications Law of 1988 requires fifty-five percent of annual
television programming be in Spanish. 2 " This requirement may be
satisfied through the importation and broadcasting of non-European
programming produced primarily in Latin America. 5" In enacting the
Spanish language quota, Spanish lawmakers clearly recognized the
common cultural heritage existing between Spain and much of Latin
America. 5 9 Spanish language programming originating in Latin America
and broadcast in Spain may further advance Spanish culture more than
Community broadcasting imported from Denmark, Germany, or Greece.
However, the Directive's quota requirement may serve to curtail the
broadcasting of Latin American programs in Spain and replace them with
European material which does little, if anything, to advance or preserve
Spanish culture. The possibility of such a result further emphasizes two
fundamental notions underlying the Directive: the Union knows more
about the definition and preservation of national and regional culture than
the member states themselves; and the supremacy of the undefinable panEuropean culture over such national and regional cultures. In the battle
for the cultural hearts and minds of the citizens of the Union, national and
regional cultures may be severely handicapped.
Another shortcoming in the Directive's proposed plan to save
European culture is its exclusion of vast areas of television programming
from the quota. The Directive excludes nonfiction and news programs,
sporting events, game shows, and advertising from the quota.26° It is
arguable that such programs, especially those from the United States,
contain an equal, if not greater, amount of foreign contaminants. For
example, despite the quota, the Cable News Network and MTV are free
to continue to spew American news, music, and fashion throughout
Europe without any limitations whatsoever. The market penetration of
these networks cannot be underestimated as any European who has heard
too much about O.J. Simpson or Madonna may tell you. American
sporting events have also achieved considerable market penetration in

257. Communications Law of 1988 (Spain), quoted in REGOURD, supra note 226, at
208.
258. Id.
259. Id.
260. Directive, supra note 48, arts. 6(1)-(4) at 27.
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Europe as evidenced by occasional broadcasts of American baseball and
football games as well as the wild popularity of the National Basketball
Association in Europe. 26' Advertising is of lesser concern given the fact
that most, if not all, member states strictly regulate television advertising.
Game shows are probably also of lesser concern given the fact that
popular American game shows are often syndicated overseas and utilize
local hosts and languages. In any event, if the Directive's true purpose is
to protect European culture from foreign contamination, the quota
requirement would have been absolute and included nonfiction, news, and
sporting events within its parameters.
The goal of cultural protection also runs aground on the Directive's
definition of a "European Work" for purposes of meeting the
programming quota.262 As previously discussed, the definition of a
"European Work" focuses more on procedure than on substance. A work
may qualify as European if it is created, produced, or funded by
Europeans or European labor is employed. There is no requirement that
the content of the production have any relation with Europe whatsoever.
Consequently, a television program set in the United States and concerning
American themes that is produced by Europeans or features a European
cast could qualify as a European work despite the complete absence of any
European cultural content.2 63 Similarly, a television program set in Europe
but featuring an American cast under the production control of a European
may qualify as a European work. 2" However, a television program
featuring a European cast and subject matter may not qualify as a
European work if it was financed or produced by non-Europeans. 265 These
anomalous results demonstrate either a lack of thought in drafting this
portion of the Directive or a true purpose other than that of cultural
preservation-specifically, economic protectionism for the European
television programming industry.2 " It is reasonable to conclude that

While a student at the
261. The author notes his own personal experience.
Georgetown University Law Center, the author encountered numerous European students
who knew more about the National Basketball Association than the author. As a lifelong
sports fan, the author found his fellow students' knowledge of the only professional sport
truly originating in the United States to be testamentary to the global reach of American
sports programming.
262. Directive, supra note 48, art. 6(2) at 27.
263. See Dimopoulos, supra note 213, at 295, n. 138.
264. Id.
265. Id.
266. United States Trade Representative Carla Hills commented on this apparent
economic rather than cultural motivation by noting that the U.S. did
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European cultural preservation in television programming requires at least
a minimal European content. The complete absence of such a requirement
in the Directive leads to the inescapable conclusion that its enactment was
motivated by and its purpose is something other than cultural preservation.
Proponents of the Directive take considerable solace in their belief
that the quota set forth in the Directive is not binding. Community VicePresident Martin Bangemann has characterized the quota requirement as
a political commitment and not a legal obligation.2 67 This sentiment was
echoed by Jean Dondelinger, the Community's broadcasting minister.268
Proponents point to the language of the Directive requiring member states
to impose quotas only "where practicable and by appropriate means" as
delegating considerable discretion to member states in the Directive's
ultimate implementation.269 Proponents holding the view that the quota
requirement is non-binding also point to the absence of enforcement
mechanisms within the Directive itself. 270 Finally, proponents refer to the
not undedskand why the Spanishx-,uhue. i tsM re 9tecAtd by a f tm prtoduced
in Germany by 'Europeans' than by a Spanish film of Mexican origin, or why
the English culture is promoted more by a film produced in France by
'Europeans' than by a film of New Zealand origin. We do not understand why
a film about French cultural history, in the French language, promotes French
culture any less simply because it is 'not of European origin'. The definition
of 'European works' is economic, not cultural.
U.S. Trade Representative Carla Hills, quoted in Presburger & Tyler, supra note 101, at
505. See also 135 Cong. Rec. H7328 (daily ed. Oct. 23, 1989). Representative Matsui
stated during a United States House of Representatives debate that "the Directive's
restrictions were based exclusively on the country of origin of the product, rather than on
the cultural content." Id.
267. See Greenhouse, supra note 109. See also Roy Denman, Television Without
Frontiers, WASH. POST, Nov. 24, 1989, at A23.
268. See Matthew Fraser, Battle of TV Quotas Heats Up in Europe; EC Directive
Leaves Few Satisfied, INT'L HERALD TRIB., Oct. 7, 1991, available in LEXIS, News
Library, TIHT File.
269. Directive, supra note 48, art. 4(1) at 26.
270. See Lupinacci, supra note 96, at 123. See also U.S. Distributors Say Quotas
Commissioner
Won't Hit Pocketbooks, BROADCASTING, Oct. 23, 1989, at 41.
Dondelinger stated that the Community "will never take a broadcaster to the European
Court if it falls a few decimal points below the target for European content." Id. Of
course, implicit in this statement is the threat to institute legal proceedings if the member
states substantially fail in their compliance efforts. This leads to the conclusion that the
member states have far less discretion with regard to implementation of the Directive than
previously believed. This conclusion was further bolstered by Edith Cresson, then
Community Minister of European Affairs, who stated that member states who failed to
fully comply with the Directive were subject to legal action. See ECAgrees Rules for "TV
Without Frontiers," Reuter Lib. Rep., March 13, 1989, available in LEXIS, World
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interpretive declaration attached to the Directive in which the Council of
4 (containing the quota requirement) is merely
Ministers stated that Article
271
a political obligation.
However, the conclusion that the quota requirement is nonbinding
cannot be reached automatically. Those who argue that the quota is
binding and enforceable against the member states point to the express
language of Article 189(3) of the EEC Treaty, which provides that all
directives shall be binding upon each member state to which it is addressed
as to the result to be achieved.27 Thus, a legitimate issue may be raised
as to whether the Community has the authority to enact nonbinding
directives or may designate a portion of a directive as nonbinding.
Furthermore, member states that fail to implement directives are clearly
subject to compliance actions by the European Commission and other
member states pursuant to Articles 169 and 170 of the EEC Treaty.273
The possibility of compliance actions being brought against member states
to enforce the quota was underscored in November, 1992, when the
European Commission issued warnings to a number of member states
regarding their alleged failure to properly implement the Directive"4 It
is also worth noting that although the Directive permits progressive
implementation of the quota, it requires implementation nonetheless.
Finally, the extensive state reporting requirements contained within the
Directive and the required disclosure of report to members of the
European Parliament and other member states may have the result of
compelling compliance despite the nonbinding nature of the quota
provision. 271
Assuming that the quota provision of the Directive is not binding, its
effect upon freedom of expression is still palpable. If the proponents of
the nonbinding nature of the quota are to be believed, the quota may have
little or no effect upon current Community programming. However, if
such is the case, the Community will have apparently expended an
excessive amount of time and effort in bringing the quota to life. If the
quota is generally viewed by members as a nonbinding, political

Library, TXTNWS File.
271. See supra note 121.
272. EEC TREATY art. 189(3).
273. Id. arts. 169, 170 at 75.
274. See Julian Newman, EC Gets Strict over FrontiersDirective-Television Limits,
Reuters Textline, Nov. 20, 1992, available in LEXIS, World Library, TXTNWS File.
Singled out for admonition were Denmark, Italy, Spain, and the United Kingdom. Id.
275. Directive, supra note 48, art. 4(1) at 26.
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commitment, why did the Community bother to address the issue of
television programming quotas? Given the amount of time and effort spent
resolving conflicts and negotiating and drafting the Directive, this result
lacks credibility.
More importantly, the drafters of the Directive have completely failed
to consider the effect of even nonbinding limitations upon the exercise of
freedom of expression. The very presence of the quota may chill the free
exercise of the right to receive and impart information despite its
nonbinding nature or the remote likelihood of an enforcement action. This
is especially true given the inherently compulsive nature of the Directive,
as created by its extensive reporting and disclosure requirements.276
Furthermore, although nonbinding, the inclusion of a quota in the
Directive may, in and of itself, be seen as the first step toward the
2
" This fear is
implementation of stricter mandatory programming quotas?.
quotas
national
for
stricter
allowance
well-founded given the Directive's
2
7
in excess of fifty percent. ' France immediately seized upon this
allowance and imposed sixty percent European and fifty percent French
.279 France's act1os o3nly
jele,
ision industry
programming quotas upon its
served to exacerbate fears of what may lay ahead in the area of Union
broadcasting legislation.
The inevitable conclusion which must be reached is that the relation
of the quota to cultural preservation is tenuous at best. However, if the
motivation was not cultural, it may be legitimately asked why the
Community spent several years in the preparation of the Green Paper and
the drafting, negotiation, and enactment of the Directive. The answer to
this question lies in an area clearly within the Community's authority.
The answer lies in economics.
The single market comprising the European Union consists of over
320 million consumers and produces a combined gross national product of
four trillion dollars.280 This market is larger than the United States and
Japan combined. 281 In this market, it is estimated that there are over 124
million households with television sets 28 2 and 31.5 million households that

276. Id.
277. See Some Support in EC is Seen for TV Quotas, supra note 253.
278. Directive, supra note 48, art. 3 at 26.
279. See JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA RItPUBLIQUE FRANCAISE, Jan. 18, 1990, at 757.
2190. Compes & Lybrand, Trade Relatls EC-USA & EC-Canada, § I (Feb. 27,
1992).
281. See Lupinacci, supra note 96, at 117, n.17.
282. Neilson Media Research, Inc., A.C. Neilson Estimates (Jan. 1990).
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subscribe to cable television.2" 3 Forty percent of all European television
owners also own a videocassette recorder.28 4 It has been estimated that,
by 1998, European broadcasters will import four billion dollars of
television programming. 8 5
The United States' audiovisual industry stands to gain or lose much
in the European marketplace. The products of the entertainment industry
constitute the United States' second largest export.2 6 The United States'
television programming exports to Europe increased by three hundred
percent in the 1970s and by over six hundred percent in the 1980s.28 7
Between 1983 and 1989, the dollar value of American film and television
sales in Europe increased by a multiple of five.288 In 1988, the United
States sold television programming worth in excess of 844 million dollars
to the Community. 9 In 1989, in excess of one billion dollars worth of
American audiovisual material was sold to the Community.29 0 American

television programming sales to the Community represented two-thirds of
the industry's sales outside of the United States. 29' Such sales undoubtedly
played a large role in the 2.5 billion dollar trade surplus generated by the
American audiovisual industry in 1989.292

By contrast, the audiovisual industry in the Community suffered a
precipitous decline and resultant inability to compete with the United States

283. Maggiore, supra note 217, at 29.
284. Id. at 67.
285. European Community; 7They Don't Love Lucy, TiME, Oct. 16, 1989, at 47.
286. See Conley, supra note 252, at 105. Defense-related products are the United
States' largest export. According to the United States Department of Defense, the market
share of the United States in the world arms market has increased from thirteen percent
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world. Id. This amount increased to 83.1 billion dollars in the period from 1991 through
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287. See 135 Cong. Rec. H7333 (daily ed. Oct. 23, 1989) (statement of Rep. Crane).
See also Wilkins, supra note 64, at 209.
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H. Farnsworth, U.S. Fights Europe TV-Show Quota, N.Y. TiMES, June 9, 1989, at Dl.
292. See Kaplan, supra note 57, at 319 n.303. See also Lupinacci, supra note 96, at
126.
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and Japan.29 3 The output of the European film industry declined from 778
features produced in 1970 to 500 features created in 1990.29 During that
twenty year period, European television programming had captured less
than two percent of the United States' market. 295 The situation had
become so desperate that, in September, 1989, the Community approved
to
a 270 million dollar subsidy to the European audiovisual industry
296
stimulate production of feature films and television programs.
Despite all of the rhetoric about culture leading up to the enactment
of the Directive, a substantial amount of time was spent discussing the
strengthening American position in the European television market and the
disarray existing in the European audiovisual industry,2 97 Throughout the
debate leading to the adoption of the Directive, reference was made to
undertaking steps to prevent the continuation of American dominance of
the European television market.298 Proponents of the Directive also stated
that one of its purposes was to increase the competitiveness of the
European television programming industry with that of foreign nations,
Proponents hoped to increase this
particularly the United States.
competitiveness through stimulation of industry ,Utput. 2 9 9 They also hped
to increase the competitiveness of the European television programming
industry by creating a larger market for its products in the Community
Given such
through the imposition of the programming quota.3"'
293. See Michel Colonna D'Istria, Les nigociationssur le commerce internationalet
"1'exception culturelle"fran~aise;Trois deferlantesdes images amiricaines,LE MONDE,
Sept. 17, 1993, at 18. See also Kaplan, supra note 57, at 319 n. 3 0 3 .
294. See Maggiore, supra note 217, at 42.
295. See Feher, supra note 96, at 79. See also Hollywood ChiefAttacks EC Plans as
Protectionist, Reuter Bus. Rep., Oct. 3t, 1989, available in LEXIS, News Library,
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296. See Presburger & Tyler, supra note 101, at 504 n.66. See also Greenhouse,
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297. See Statements of Reps. Barzanti, Schinzel, and Medina Ortega, 1989 O.J.
(Annex 2-378) 110-11, 113-14, 120 (May 24, 1989) (Debates of the European
Parliament).
298. See Presburger & Tyler, supra note 101, at 497. See also Green Paper, supra
note 36, at 33. See also Conley, supra note 252, at 91. Conley dubbed the American
domination of the European television market which proponents of the Directive hoped to
end as "Wall-to-Wall Dallas" , Id.
299. See Lupinacci, supra note 96, at 120 n.35. See also Europe andAmerica Prepare
for 1992, supra note 22, at 316. Uif Bruhann, the head of the Suopean Commission's
[T]he
media sector, stated that "[t]he European programming industry is weak ....
industry [must be put] in a position to increase its output." Id.
300. See EC Agrees Rulesfor "TV Without Frontiers," supra note 270. Edith Cresson,
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references, it is safe to conclude that the flagging European television
industry was on the minds of members of the Council of Ministers and the
European Parliament throughout the period of time leading up to the
enactment of the Directive.
Commentators analyzing the Directive have been of two minds in
weighing its economic and cultural justifications. While acknowledging
the legitimacy of European cultural concerns, some commentators have
concluded that the preservation of European culture is only incidental to
economic considerations. 0 1 Other commentators have concluded that the
Directive's quota requirement has little, if anything, to do with cultural
preservation or the freer exchange of information between the peoples of
Europe.3"2 Rather, these commentators conclude that the purpose of the
quota is to assist the struggling European television programming industry
through production incentives and market protection.30 3
Regardless which point of view one adopts, three conclusions are
inescapable. First, there is a legitimate issue as to whether the protection
and preservation of European culture from foreign influence is necessary.
After all, "European culture has survived alien incursions for centuries
.. . [and] a quota to guard its integrity at this late date [is
unnecessary]." 3" Second, even if there is a present need to protect
European culture from foreign television broadcasting, the quota contained
within the Directive does not bear a rational relationship to its purported
cultural purpose. Finally, the sheer size of the industry and the potential
market and the amount of revenue at stake inevitably lead one to conclude
that economics played a primary, if not an exclusive, role in motivating
Although the
the Community to enact the programming quota.
preservation of culture may justify narrow and temporary derogations from
fundamental freedoms guaranteed in international and regional human
rights instruments, there is no permissible derogation for economic
protectionism. The cultural preservation argument must therefore fail for
lack of factual support, while the economic protectionism argument must
fail for lack of an adequate legal basis.

then Minister for European Affairs, stated that the purpose of the Directive was "to build
up a market for European producers." Id.
301. See Kaplan, supra note 57, at 291 n.169.
302. See Dimopoulos, supra note 213, at 297; Feher, supra note 96, at 112.
303. Id.
304. Rationing 'Dallas' in Europe, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 24, 1989, at A26.
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V. CONCLUSION

The European Union's television broadcasting policy is a mass of
contradictions. The initial policy, as reflected in the CAHMM Reports,
published in 1980, was that of a Community on the edge of the global
television revolution, eager to impart and receive information with little
thought of content regulation and source of programming. This openness
changed dramatically during the period from 1980 to 1986, when the first
Community broadcast initiative was proposed in the Green Paper. Not
coincidentally, this change in attitude occurred at a time when the
European television programming industry was declining in
competitiveness, which resulted in decreased output and a weakened ability
to protect its market share on the Continent.
The changes recommended in the Green Paper gained further strength
in early 1989, with the inclusion of quota provision in the European
Convention and the Charter of Delphes. The quota contained within the
Convention was the immediate ancestor of the quota included in the
Directive six months later. In addition to approving the imposition of a
programming quota, the Television Convention provided the political
foundation necessary for the adoption of the Directive. This same
foundational role was played by the Charter, in which the European
artistic community lent its support to the imposition of a programming
quota.
As a result of this groundwork, the Directive came to fruition shortly
thereafter in September, 1989. However, despite the intensive buildup to
a programming quota, the Directive demonstrated deep divisions among
the member states. Some states that opposed the quota contended that the
Community was incompetent to act in the area of cultural affairs. Others
objected to the quota as an impermissible intrusion upon areas traditionally
reserved for member state action.
Proponents of the Directive argued that the Community was
competent to act in this area as television programming constituted a
service within the scope of the founding treaties. In this regard,
proponents of the quota pointed to a weakened European television
industry badly in need of financial support and protection. These same
proponents also declared that a cultural crisis existed and resulted from the
fact that the Continent was awash in foreign television programming. This
programming, no more than forty years-old, purportedly threatened the
Proponents
very foundation of centuries-old European civilization.
concluded that this cultural crisis required the enactment of a strict
television programming quota.
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The Directive that resulted from this process is highly contradictory
and deeply flawed. Politicians clashed over the issue of whether the quota
was legally binding or merely a toothless political commitment. The
exclusion of nonfiction works, news, and sporting events created a large
breach in the wall through which the invasion of European homes by
foreign television programming could continue. Finally, the definition of
"European works" seems to favor form over substance and procedure over
content. Works that bear only the most tangential relation to Europe are
labelled European works while other productions more deserving of the
designation are denied recognition.
Given this history, it is not surprising that the Directive bears no
rational relationship to its most heralded goal of protecting and preserving
European culture. Although purporting to preserve "pan-European"
culture, the Directive provides no definition of such culture but simply
presumes its existence. The Directive arrogantly disregards the will of the
people and imposes in its stead governmentally-defined and protected
culture. This demonstrates an inherent distrust of the general populace to
control their own cultural destiny and is not supported by the viewing
habits of a majority of Eurocitizens. The Union should consider surveys
indicating that most Eurocitizens do not perceive American culture as a
threat to European culture but do express concern over the effect of
greater Community integration upon national and regional cultures.
The concern Eurocitizens have expressed regarding the preservation
of national and regional cultures will not be allayed by the Directive. The
Directive's programming quota is imposed without regard to the national
and regional cultures of smaller member states that cannot compete with
the predominant cultures of larger member states with developed
audiovisual industries. The Directive implicitly informs citizens of smaller
member states that their cultures are less significant and worthy of
protection and that, in any event, the Community best knows how to
define their cultural destiny.
Despite the inflamed rhetoric concerning the presence of barbaric
Americans at the gates of the European cultural fortress, the Directive's
underlying motivation was clearly an economic one. The Directive's
provisions may not rationally relate to cultural protection and preservation;
however, they do relate to economic protectionism. The medium of
television is pervasive, the financial stakes in the industry are enormous,
and the potential for growth seems limitless. Recognizing that the
European television industry is unable to compete effectively on an
international basis with its more powerful American and Japanese
counterparts, the Community has turned inward, intent on capturing and
preserving the single largest market in the Western world. The cultural
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preservation argument is merely a threadbare cloak tossed over blatant
economic protectionism. Europeans have not been culturally wronged but
perceive themselves as being economically wronged in one, albeit large,
industry in which they are at a substantial comparative disadvantage.
Lost in all of the debate regarding the Directive is the shocking effect
of the quota upon the free expression and receipt of information and ideas.
It would be an exaggeration and overly elevate the status of the Directive
to equate it with a reversal of the European tradition of freedom of
expression as exemplified by Voltaire, Montesquieu, and Rousseau.
However, the quota requirement set forth in the Directive is clearly
inconsistent with this tradition.
This European tradition was clearly expressed in a binding fashion in
the European Convention and in a less binding manner in the Helsinki
Accords, the Copenhagen Document, and the Charter of Paris. As
evidenced by the nearly universal acceptance of the International Bill of
Rights, this freedom has or will rapidly attain the status of a norm of
international law. The Directive violates all three instruments of the
International Bill of Rights by imposing restrictions upon the transmission
and receipt of information on the basis of its content and origin. The only
possible ground justifying this derogation is cultural preservation, which
is neither clearly nor adequately served by the Directive.
In order to eliminate this breach of the member states' human rights
obligations, it is necessary to return to the operation of the free market in
the European television programming industry. A return to free market
principles would restore freedom of choice to European television viewers.
It has been correctly noted that "no matter what quotas are set, people will
always vote with their remote controls. "305 If programming does not meet
a viewer's expectations, he or she may change channels or engage in a
more revolutionary act by turning off the television set. In any event, it
is time for the Union to return the remote control to its citizens and trust
them to make decisions that will preserve Europe's continental, national,
and regional cultures and traditions.

305. Timothy Harper, Europe May Unite, But Will Still Turn to U.S. TV, ELEC.
MEDIA, Oct. 21, 1991, at 10. See also Dimopoulos, supra note 213, at 296.

